Setting-up penetration testing campaigns

ABSTRACT

Methods and systems for penetration testing of a networked system by a penetration testing system (e.g. that is controlled by a user interface of a computing device) are disclosed herein. In one example, a penetration testing campaign is executed according to a manual and explicit selecting of one or more network nodes of the networked system. Alternatively or additionally, a penetration testing campaign is executed according to a manually and explicitly selected node-selection condition. Alternatively or additionally, a penetration testing campaign is executed according to an automatic selecting of one or more network nodes of the networked system.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This patent application is a continuation of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 15/681,692 which was filed on Aug. 21, 2017 and which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety. U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 15/681,692 claims the benefit of U.S. ProvisionalPatent Application No. 62/453,056 filed on Feb. 1, 2017, which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

There is currently a proliferation of organizational networked systems.Every type of organization, be it a commercial company, a university, abank, a government agency or a hospital, heavily relies on one or morenetworks interconnecting multiple computing nodes. Failures of thenetworked system of an organization or even of only a portion of itmight cause a significant damage, up to completely shutting down alloperations. Additionally, much of the data of the organization (and forsome organizations even all data) exists somewhere on its networkedsystem, including all confidential data comprising its “crown jewels”such as prices, details of customers, purchase orders, employees'salaries, technical formulas, etc. Loss of such data or leaks of suchdata to outside unauthorized entities might be disastrous for theorganization.

Many organizational networks are connected to the Internet at leastthrough one network node, and consequently they are subject to attacksby computer hackers or by hostile adversaries. Even an organizationalnetwork that is not connected to the Internet might be attacked by anemployee of the organization. Quite often the newspapers are reportingincidents in which websites crashed, sensitive data was stolen orservice to customers was denied, where the failures were the results ofhostile penetration into an organization's networked system.

Thus, many organizations invest a lot of efforts and costs in preventivemeans designed to protect their networked systems against potentialthreats. There are many defensive products offered in the marketclaiming to provide protection against one or more known modes ofattack, and many organizations arm themselves to the teeth with multipleproducts of this kind.

However, it is difficult to tell how effective such products really arein achieving their stated goals of blocking hostile attacks, andconsequently most CISO's (Computer Information Security Officers) willadmit (maybe only off the record), that they don't really know how wellthey can withstand an attack from a given adversary. The only way toreally know how strong and secure a networked system is, is by trying toattack it as a real adversary would. This is known as penetrationtesting (pen testing, in short), and is a very common approach that iseven required by regulation in some developed countries.

Penetration testing requires highly talented people to man the testingteam. Those people should be familiar with each and every known securityvulnerability and attacking method and should also have a very goodfamiliarity with networking techniques and multiple operating systemsimplementations. Such people are hard to find and therefore manyorganizations give up establishing their own penetration testing teamsand resort to hiring external expert consultants for carrying out thatrole (or completely give up penetration testing). But externalconsultants are expensive and therefore are typically called in only forbrief periods separated by long time intervals in which no such testingis done. This makes the penetration testing ineffective as securityvulnerabilities caused by new forms of attacks that appear almost dailyare discovered only months after becoming serious threats to theorganization.

Additionally, even rich organizations that can afford hiring talentedexperts for in-house penetration testing teams do not achieve goodprotection. Testing for security vulnerabilities of a large networkedsystem containing many types of computers, operating systems, networkrouters and other devices is both a very complex and a very tediousprocess. The process is prone to human errors of missing testing forcertain threats or misinterpreting the damages of certain attacks. Also,because a process of full testing of a large networked system againstall threats is quite long, the organization might again end with a toolong discovery period after a new threat appears.

Because of the above deficiencies automated penetration testingsolutions were introduced in recent years by multiple vendors. Theseautomated solutions reduce human involvement in the penetration testingprocess, or at least in some of its functions.

A penetration testing process involves at least the following mainfunctions: (i) a reconnaissance function, (ii) an attack function, and(ii) a reporting function. The process may also include additionalfunctions, for example a cleanup function that restores the testednetworked system to its original state as it was before the test. In anautomated penetration testing system, at least one of the above threefunctions is at least partially automated, and typically two or three ofthem are at least partially automated.

A reconnaissance function is the function within a penetration testingsystem that handles the collection of data about the tested networkedsystem. The collected data may include internal data of networks nodes,data about network traffic within the tested networked system, businessintelligence data of the organization owning the tested networkedsystem, etc. The functionality of a prior art reconnaissance functioncan be implemented, for example, by software executing in a server thatis not one of the network nodes of the tested networked system, wherethe server probes the tested networked system for the purpose ofcollecting data about it.

An attack function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the determination of whether security vulnerabilities existin the tested networked system based on data collected by thereconnaissance function. The functionality of a prior art attackfunction can be implemented, for example, by software executing in aserver that is not one of the nodes of the tested networked system,where the server attempts to attack the tested networked system for thepurpose of verifying that it can be compromised.

A reporting function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the reporting of results of the penetration testing system.The functionality of a prior art reporting function may be implemented,for example, by software executing in the same server that executes thefunctionality of the attack function, where the server reports thefindings of the attack function to an administrator or a CISO of thetested networked system.

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system. FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a related flow-chart.

In FIG. 1A, code for the reconnaissance function, for the attackfunction, and for the reporting function are respectively labelled as20, 30 and 40, and are each schematically illustrated as part of apenetration testing system code module (PTSCM) labelled as 10. The term‘code’ is intended broadly and may include any combination ofcomputer-executable code and computer-readable data which when readaffects the output of execution of the code. The computer-executablecode may be provided as any combination of human-readable code (e.g. ina scripting language such as Python), machine language code, assemblercode and byte code, or in any form known in the art. Furthermore, theexecutable code may include any stored data (e.g. structured data) suchas configuration files, XML files, and data residing in any type ofdatabase (e.g. a relational database, an object-database, etc.).

In one example and as shown in FIG. 1B, the reconnaissance function(performed in step S21 by execution of reconnaissance function code 20),the attack function (performed in step S31 by execution of attackfunction code 30) and the reporting function (performed in step S41 byexecution of reporting function code 40) are executed in strictlysequential order so that first the reconnaissance function is performedby executing code 20 thereof, then the attack function is performed byexecuting code 30 thereof, and finally the reporting function isperformed 40 by executing code thereof. However, the skilled artisanwill appreciate that this order is just one example, and is not arequirement. For example, the attack and the reporting functions may beperformed in parallel or in an interleaved way, with the reportingfunction reporting first results obtained by the attack function, whilethe attack function is working on additional results. Similarly, thereconnaissance and the attack functions may operate in parallel or in aninterleaved way, with the attack function detecting a vulnerabilitybased on first data collected by the reconnaissance function, while thereconnaissance function is working on collecting additional data.

FIG. 1A also illustrates code of an optional cleanup function which islabeled as 50. Also illustrated in FIG. 1B is step S51 of performing acleanup function—e.g. by cleanup function code 50 of FIG. 1A.

“A campaign of penetration testing” is a specific run of a specific testof a specific networked system by the penetration testing system.

A penetration-testing-campaign module may comprise at least part ofreconnaissance function code 20, attack function code 30 and optionallycleanup function code 50—for example, in combination with suitablehardware (e.g. one or more computing device 110 and one or moreprocessor(s) 120 thereof) for executing the code.

FIG. 2 illustrates a prior art computing device 110 which may have anyform-factor including but not limited to a laptop, a desktop, a mobilephone, a server, a tablet, or any other form factor. The computingdevice 110 in FIG. 2 includes (i) computer memory 160 which may storecode 180; (ii) one or more processors 120 (e.g. central-processing-unit(CPU)) for executing code 180; (iii) a human-interface device 140 (e.g.mouse, keyboard, touchscreen, gesture-detecting apparatus including acamera, etc.) or an interface (e.g. USB interface) to receive input froma human-interface device; (iv) a display device 130 (e.g. computerscreen) or an interface (e.g. HDMI interface, USB interface) forexporting video to a display device and (v) a network interface 150(e.g. a network card, or a wireless modem).

Memory 160 may include any combination of volatile (e.g. RAM) andnon-volatile (e.g. ROM, flash, disk-drive) memory.

Code 180 may include operating-system code—e.g. Windows®, Linux®,Android®, Mac-OS®.

Computing device 110 may include a user-interface for receiving inputfrom a user (e.g. manual input, visual input, audio input, or input inany other form) and for visually displaying output. The user-interface(e.g. graphical user interface (GUI)) of computing device 110 may thusinclude the combination of HID device 140 or an interface thereof (i.e.in communication with an external HID device 140), display device 130 oran interface thereof (i.e. in communication with an external displaydevice), and user-interface (UI) code stored in memory 160 and executedby one or more processor(s) 120. The user-interface may include one ormore GUI widgets such as labels, buttons (e.g. radio buttons or checkboxes), sliders, spinners, icons, windows, panels, text boxes, and thelike.

In one example, a penetration testing system is the combination of (i)code 10 (e.g. including reconnaissance function code 20, attack functioncode 30, reporting function code 40, and optionally cleaning functioncode 50); and (ii) one or more computing devices 110 which execute thecode 10. For example, a first computing device may execute a firstportion of code 10 and a second computing device (e.g. in networkedcommunication with the first computing device) may execute a secondportion of code 10.

FIGS. 3 and 4A-4D relate to a prior art example of penetration testingof a networked system. FIG. 3 shows a timeline—i.e. the penetration testbegins at a time labelled as T_(Begin Pen-Test). Subsequent points intime, during the penetration test, are labelled in FIG. 3 as T¹_(During Pen-Test), T² _(During Pen-Test) and T³ _(During Pen-Test).

FIG. 4A shows an example networked system comprising a plurality of 24network nodes labelled N101, N102 . . . N124. In the present document, anetwork node may be referred to simply as ‘node’—‘network node’ and‘node’ are interchangeable.

Each network node may be a different computing device 110. Two networknodes are “immediate neighbors” of each other if and only if they have adirect communication link between them that does not pass through anyother network node.

In the example of FIG. 4A, this is represented by an edge between thetwo nodes—thus, in this example nodes N108 and N112 are immediateneighbors while nodes N108 and N115 are not immediate neighbors.

Embodiments of the invention relate to penetration testing of networkedsystems, such as that illustrated in FIG. 4A.

During penetration testing, a node may become compromised. In theexamples of FIGS. 4A-4D compromised nodes are indicated by an “X” in thecircle—all other nodes have not yet been compromised.

The term “compromising a network node” is defined as: Successfullycausing execution of an operation in the network node that is notallowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules defined byan administrator of the network node, or successfully causing executionof code in a software module of the network node that was not predictedby the vendor of the software module. Examples for compromising anetwork node are reading a file without having read permission for it,modifying a file without having write permission for it, deleting a filewithout having delete permission for it, exporting a file out of thenetwork node without having permission to do so, getting an access righthigher than the one originally assigned without having permission to getit, getting a priority higher than the one originally assigned withouthaving permission to get it, changing a configuration of a firewallnetwork node such that it allows access to other network nodes that werepreviously hidden behind the firewall without having permission to doit, and causing execution of software code by utilizing a bufferoverflow. As shown by the firewall example, the effects of compromisinga certain network node are not necessarily limited to that certainnetwork node. In addition, executing successful ARP spoofing,denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle or session-hijacking attacksagainst a network node are also considered compromising that networknode, even if not satisfying any of the conditions listed above in thisdefinition.

According to the example illustrated in FIGS. 4A-4D, initially, at timeT_(Begin Pen-Test), when the penetration test begins, none of thenetwork-nodes have yet been compromised. Between time T_(Begin Pen-Test)and T¹ _(During Pen-Test), network node N122 is compromised—this isindicated in FIG. 4B by the “X.’ Between time T¹ _(During Pen-Test) andT² _(During Pen-Test), network nodes N116 and N112 are compromised, asindicated by the X's in FIG. 4C. Between time T² _(During Pen-Test) andT³ _(During Pen-Test), network nodes N110 and N111 are compromised, asindicated by the X's in FIG. 4D.

In this particular example, it is assumed that it is easier for anattacker to compromise a node if one or more of its immediate neighborshas been compromised.

The Problem To Solve

When a user desires to operate a prior art penetration testing systemfor running a test on a specific networked system, the penetrationtesting system must know what test it should execute. For example, thepenetration testing system must know what is the type of attackeragainst whom the test is making its assessment (a state-sponsored actor,a cyber criminal etc.) and what are his capabilities. As anotherexample, the penetration testing system must know what is the goal ofthe attacker according to which the attack will be judged as a successor a failure (copying a specific file and exporting it out of the testednetworked system, encrypting a specific directory of a specific networknode for ransom, etc.).

A specific run of a specific test of a specific networked system by apenetration testing system is called a “campaign” of that penetrationtesting system and entails performing at least the reconnaissance (stepS21 of FIG. 1B), attack (step S31 of FIG. 1B) and reporting (step S41 ofFIG. 1B) functions. A collection of values for all information items apenetration testing system must know before executing a campaign iscalled “specifications of the campaign” or “scenario”. For example, thetype of the attacker and the goal of the attacker are specificinformation items of a campaign, and specific values for them are partsof the specifications of any campaign.

The results of the penetration testing campaign may be reported byperforming the reporting function (step S41) of FIG. 1B.

All prior art penetration testing systems are not flexible in lettingthe user define the specifications of a campaign. Typically, thosesystems are delivered with a library of pre-defined campaignspecifications from which the user should choose.

Some prior art penetration testing systems provide slightly betterflexibility by allowing the user to select a scenario based on explicitselection of the type of the attacker. The user may be presented with aclosed list of alternatives for the type of the attacker—astate-sponsored actor, a cyber criminal, an amateur hacker, etc., and hemay choose one of those alternatives. Once the user picks one of thelisted alternatives, the system selects a pre-defined scenario whosetype of attacker is the same as the picked alternative. All other fieldsof the specifications of the campaign (goal of the attacker,capabilities of the attacker, etc.) are automatically decided either bythe selected pre-defined scenario or by internal algorithms of thepenetration testing system, with no explicit input from the user. Theinternal algorithms may depend on the user-selected type of attackerand/or on pre-defined information items of the selected pre-definedscenario, and/or on a random process. For example, the capabilities ofthe attacker may be automatically defined based on the type of theattacker, while the lateral movement strategy of the attacker may bepicked at random from a pre-defined list of available strategies.

This rigid campaign definition is not satisfactory for many users, whowould like to have greater control over the specifications of thecampaigns they run for testing their networked systems. Such controlwill allow them to test specific combinations of features of scenarios,which might be impossible to test with prior art systems.

SUMMARY OF EMBODIMENTS

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toone or more manually and explicitly-selected capabilities of an attackerof the penetration testing campaign, the method comprising: receiving,by the penetration testing system and via the user interface of thecomputing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting one or more capabilities ofthe attacker of the penetration testing campaign; executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the oneor more capabilities of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem; and reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least onesecurity vulnerability determined to exist in the networked system bythe executing of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the reportingcomprises at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, and (ii)electronically transmitting a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the oneor more capabilities of the attacker, the penetration testing systemautomatically computes and displays an explicit recommendation forselecting the one or more capabilities of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, further comprising: subsequent to the receiving bythe penetration testing system of the one or more manually-enteredinputs that explicitly select the one or more capabilities of theattacker, receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the userinterface of the computing device, one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs, the one or more additional manually-enteredinputs explicitly selecting a value for a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the second information item is nota capability of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected one or more capabilities of the attacker.

In some embodiments, further comprising: subsequent to the receiving bythe penetration testing system of the one or more manually-enteredinputs that explicitly select the one or more capabilities of theattacker, receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the userinterface of the computing device, one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs, the one or more additional manually-enteredinputs explicitly selecting a method of one of the manually andexplicitly selected one or more capabilities of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected one ormore capabilities of the attacker, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected method.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. an attacker-capability-selection user interface includingone or more user interface components for manual and explicit selectionof one or more capabilities of an attacker of a penetration testingcampaign; b. a penetration-testing-campaign module programmed to performthe penetration testing campaign whose attacker has the one or morecapabilities that are manually and explicitly selected via theattacker-capability-selection user interface; and c. a reporting modulefor reporting at least one security vulnerability determined to exist inthe networked system according to results of the penetration testingcampaign that is performed by the penetration-testing-campaign module,wherein the reporting module is configured to report the at least onesecurity vulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the one or more capabilities of the attacker, wherein theattacker-capability-selection user interface displays the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the one or more capabilities of the attackerincludes a manual and explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a capability of the attacker, wherein the system is configured toreceive the manual and explicit selection of the value of the secondinformation item subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of theone or more capabilities.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the one or more capabilities of the attacker and (ii) the value of thesecond information item, to perform the penetration testing campaignusing both (i) the manually and explicitly selected one or morecapabilities of the attacker and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected value of the second information item.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a method of one capability of the manually andexplicitly selected one or more capabilities of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the system is configured toreceive the manual and explicit selection of the method of the onecapability subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of the onecapability.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the one or more capabilities of the attacker and (ii) the method of theone capability, to perform the penetration testing campaign using both(ii) the manually and explicitly selected one or more capabilities ofthe attacker and (ii) the manually and explicitly selected method of theone capability.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toone or more manually and explicitly-selected traits of an attacker ofthe penetration testing campaign, the method comprising: receiving, bythe penetration testing system and via the user interface of thecomputing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting one or more traits of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign; executing the penetrationtesting campaign, by the penetration testing system and according to themanually and explicitly-provided selection of the one or more traits ofthe attacker, so as to test the networked system; and reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the oneor more traits of the attacker, the penetration testing systemautomatically computes and displays an explicit recommendation forselecting the one or more traits of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the method further comprising: subsequent to thereceiving by the penetration testing system of the one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the one or more traits ofthe attacker, receiving, by the penetration testing system and via theuser interface of the computing device, one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs, the one or more additional manually-enteredinputs explicitly selecting a value for a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the second information item is nota trait of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected one or more traits of the attacker.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. an attacker-trait-selection user interface including oneor more user interface components for manual and explicit selection ofone or more traits of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign; b.a penetration-testing-campaign module programmed to perform thepenetration testing campaign whose attacker has the one or more traitsthat are manually and explicitly selected via theattacker-trait-selection user interface; and c. a reporting module forreporting at least one security vulnerability determined to exist in thenetworked system according to results of the penetration testingcampaign that is performed by the penetration-testing-campaign module,wherein the reporting module is configured to report the at least onesecurity vulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the one or more traits of the attacker, wherein theattacker-trait-selection user interface displays the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the one or more traits of the attacker includes amanual and explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a trait of the attacker, wherein the system is configured toreceive the manual and explicit selection of the value of the secondinformation item subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of theone or more traits.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the one or more traits of the attacker and (ii) the value of the secondinformation item, to perform the penetration testing campaign using both(i) the manually and explicitly selected one or more traits of theattacker and (ii) the manually and explicitly selected value of thesecond information item.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according to amanual and explicit selecting of one or more network nodes of thenetworked system, the method comprising: receiving, by the penetrationtesting system and via the user interface of the computing device, oneor more manually-entered inputs, the one or more manually-entered inputsexplicitly selecting the one or more network nodes of the networkedsystem, wherein at least one of the manually and explicitly selectednodes is other than the computing device; in accordance with the manualand explicit selecting of the network nodes, executing the penetrationtesting campaign by the penetration testing system so as to test thenetworked system, the penetration testing campaign being executed underthe assumption that the manually and explicitly selected one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system are already compromised at thetime of beginning the penetration testing campaign; and reporting, bythe penetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the oneor more network nodes of the networked system, the penetration testingsystem automatically computes and displays an explicit recommendationfor selecting the one or more network nodes that are already compromisedat the time of beginning the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the method further comprising: subsequent to thereceiving by the penetration testing system of the one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the one or more networknodes of the networked system, receiving, by the penetration testingsystem and via the user interface of the computing device, one or moreadditional manually-entered inputs, the one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a value for a secondinformation item of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the secondinformation item is not a set of one or more network nodes that areassumed to be already compromised at the time of beginning thepenetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) an assumption that themanually and explicitly selected one or more network nodes of thenetworked system are already compromised at the time of beginning thepenetration testing campaign.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a network-nodes-selection user interface including one ormore user interface components for manual and explicit selection of oneor more network nodes, where the network-nodes-selection user interfaceresides in a computing device and at least one of the manually andexplicitly selected one or more network nodes is other than thecomputing device; b. a penetration-testing-campaign module programmed toperform a penetration testing campaign under the assumption that themanually and explicitly selected one or more network nodes of thenetworked system are already compromised at the time of beginning thepenetration testing campaign; and c. a reporting module for reporting atleast one security vulnerability determined to exist in the networkedsystem according to results of the penetration testing campaign that isperformed by the penetration-testing-campaign module, wherein thereporting module is configured to report the at least one securityvulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing a display deviceto display a report describing the at least one security vulnerability,and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describing the at leastone security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the one or more network nodes, wherein thenetwork-nodes-selection user interface displays the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the one or more network nodes includes a manualand explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan one or more network nodes, wherein the system is configured toreceive the manual and explicit selection of the value of the secondinformation item subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of theone or more network nodes.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the one or more network nodes and (ii) the value of the secondinformation item, to perform the penetration testing campaign using both(i) the manually and explicitly selected one or more network nodes and(ii) the manually and explicitly selected value of the secondinformation item.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according to amanually and explicitly provided node-selection condition, the methodcomprising: receiving, by the penetration testing system and via theuser interface of the computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs, the one or more manually-entered inputs explicitly selecting aBoolean node-selection condition, the manually and explicitly selectednode-selection condition defining a proper subset of network nodes ofthe networked system such that any network node of the networked systemis a member of the subset of network nodes if and only if it satisfiesthe condition; in accordance with the manual and explicit selecting ofthe node-selection condition, executing the penetration testing campaignby the penetration testing system so as to test the networked system,the penetration testing campaign being executed under the assumptionthat every node of the subset of network nodes is already compromised atthe time of beginning the penetration testing campaign; and reporting,by the penetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select theBoolean node-selection condition, the penetration testing systemautomatically computes and displays an explicit recommendation forselecting the Boolean node-selection condition.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputsfor selecting the Boolean node-selection condition comprise an explicituser approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the method further comprising: subsequent to thereceiving by the penetration testing system of the one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the Booleannode-selection condition, receiving, by the penetration testing systemand via the user interface of the computing device, one or moreadditional manually-entered inputs, the one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a value for a secondinformation item of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the secondinformation item is not a node-selection condition defining a subset ofnetwork nodes that are assumed to be already compromised at the time ofbeginning the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) an assumption that every nodeof the subset of network nodes is already compromised at the time ofbeginning the penetration testing campaign.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a node-selection-condition user interface including oneor more user interface components for manually and explicitly selectinga Boolean node-selection condition defining a proper subset of networknodes of the networked system such that any network node of thenetworked system is a member of the subset of network nodes if and onlyif it satisfies the condition; b. a penetration-testing-campaign moduleprogrammed to perform a penetration testing campaign under theassumption that every network node of the subset of network nodes isalready compromised at the time of beginning the penetration testingcampaign; and c. a reporting module for reporting at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system according toresults of the penetration testing campaign that is performed by thepenetration-testing-campaign module, wherein the reporting module isconfigured to report the at least one security vulnerability byperforming at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, and (ii)electronically transmitting a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the Boolean node-selection condition, wherein thenode-selection-condition user interface displays the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the Boolean node-selection condition includes amanual and explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a Boolean node-selection condition, wherein the system isconfigured to receive the manual and explicit selection of the value ofthe second information item subsequent to the manual and explicitselection of the Boolean node-selection condition.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the Boolean node-selection condition and (ii) the value of the secondinformation item, to perform the penetration testing campaign using both(i) the manually and explicitly selected Boolean node-selectioncondition and (ii) the manually and explicitly selected value of thesecond information item.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toan automatic selecting of one or more network nodes of the networkedsystem, the method comprising: determining, by the penetration testingsystem, at least one of (i) a type of an attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign, and (ii) whether one or more network nodes of thenetworked system satisfy a pre-defined Boolean condition; based on aresult of the determining, automatically selecting, by the penetrationtesting system, the one or more network nodes of the networked system,wherein at least one of the automatically selected network nodes isother than the computing device; in accordance with the automaticallyselecting of the network nodes, executing the penetration testingcampaign by the penetration testing system so as to test the networkedsystem, the penetration testing campaign being executed under theassumption that the automatically selected one or more network nodes ofthe networked system are already compromised at the time of beginningthe penetration testing campaign; and reporting, by the penetrationtesting system, at least one security vulnerability determined to existin the networked system by the executing of the penetration testingcampaign, wherein the reporting comprises at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the determining comprises determining the type ofthe attacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises automatically determining the type of the attacker by thepenetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises receiving, via the user interface of the computing device, oneor more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the type of theattacker.

In some embodiments, the determining comprises automatically determiningwhether the one or more network nodes of the networked system satisfythe pre-defined Boolean condition.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has a directconnection to a computing device that is outside the networked system.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has anoperating system that is a member of a pre-defined set of operatingsystems.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has acellular communication channel.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system that iscontrolled by a user interface of a computing device, the systemcomprising: a. a node-selection module configured to: determine at leastone of (i) a type of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign, and(ii) whether one or more network nodes of the networked system satisfy apre-defined Boolean condition; and based on a result of the determining,automatically select one or more network nodes of the networked system,wherein at least one of the automatically selected network nodes isother than the computing device; b. a penetration-testing-campaignmodule programmed to perform the penetration testing campaign under theassumption that the automatically selected one or more network nodes ofthe networked system are already compromised at the time of beginningthe penetration testing campaign; and c. a reporting module forreporting at least one security vulnerability determined to exist in thenetworked system according to results of the penetration testingcampaign that is performed by the penetration-testing-campaign module,wherein the reporting module is configured to report the at least onesecurity vulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the node-selection module is configured todetermine the type of the attacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the node-selection module is configured toautomatically determine the type of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.

In some embodiments, the node-selection module is configured todetermine the type of the attacker by receiving, via the user interfaceof the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs thatexplicitly select the type of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the node-selection module is configured toautomatically determine whether the one or more network nodes of thenetworked system satisfy the pre-defined Boolean condition.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has a directconnection to a computing device that is outside the networked system.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has anoperating system that is a member of a pre-defined set of operatingsystems.

In some embodiments, the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied fora given network node if and only if the given network node has acellular communication channel.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toone or more manually and explicitly-selected goals of an attacker of thepenetration testing campaign, the method comprising: receiving, by thepenetration testing system and via the user interface of the computingdevice, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting one or more goals of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign, wherein at least one goalof the one or more goals satisfies at least one condition selected fromthe group consisting of: i. the at least one goal is a resource-specificgoal; ii. the at least one goal is a file-specific goal; iii. the atleast one goal is a node-count-maximizing goal; iv. the at least onegoal is a file-count-maximizing goal; v. the at least one goal is anencryption-related goal; vi. the at least one goal is a file-exportinggoal; vii. the at least one goal is a file-size-related goal; viii. theat least one goal is a file-type-related goal; ix. the at least one goalis a file-damage-related goal; and x. the at least one goal is anode-condition-based goal; executing the penetration testing campaign,by the penetration testing system and according to the manually andexplicitly-provided selection of the one or more goals of the attacker,so as to test the networked system; and reporting, by the penetrationtesting system, at least one security vulnerability determined to existin the networked system by the executing of the penetration testingcampaign, wherein the reporting comprises at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a resource-specific goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-specific goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a node-count-maximizinggoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-count-maximizinggoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is an encryption-relatedgoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-exporting goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-size-related goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-type-related goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-damage-relatedgoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a node-condition-basedgoal.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the oneor more goals of the attacker, the penetration testing systemautomatically computes and displays an explicit recommendation forselecting the one or more goals of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the method further comprising: subsequent to thereceiving by the penetration testing system of the one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the one or more goals ofthe attacker, receiving, by the penetration testing system and via theuser interface of the computing device, one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs, the one or more additional manually-enteredinputs explicitly selecting a value for a second information item of thecampaign of the penetration testing system, wherein the secondinformation item is not a goal of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected one or more goals of the attacker.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a goals-selection user interface including one or moreuser interface components for manual and explicit selection of one ormore goals of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign, wherein atleast one goal of the one or more goals satisfies at least one conditionselected from the group consisting of: i. the at least one goal is aresource-specific goal; ii. the at least one goal is a file-specificgoal; iii. the at least one goal is a node-count-maximizing goal; iv.the at least one goal is a file-count-maximizing goal; v. the at leastone goal is an encryption-related goal; vi. the at least one goal is afile-exporting goal; vii. the at least one goal is a file-size-relatedgoal; viii. the at least one goal is a file-type-related goal; ix. theat least one goal is a file-damage-related goal; and x. the at least onegoal is a node-condition-based goal; b. a penetration-testing-campaignmodule programmed to perform the penetration testing campaign whoseattacker has the one or more goals that are manually and explicitlyselected via the goals-selection user interface; and c. a reportingmodule for reporting at least one security vulnerability determined toexist in the networked system according to results of the penetrationtesting campaign that is performed by the penetration-testing-campaignmodule, wherein the reporting module is configured to report the atleast one security vulnerability by performing at least one of (i)causing a display device to display a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a reportdescribing the at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a resource-specific goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-specific goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a node-count-maximizinggoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-count-maximizinggoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is an encryption-relatedgoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-exporting goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-size-related goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-type-related goal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a file-damage-relatedgoal.

In some embodiments, the at least one goal is a node-condition-basedgoal.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the one or more goals of the attacker, wherein thegoals-selection user interface displays the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the one or more goals of the attacker includes amanual and explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a goal of the attacker, wherein the system is configured to receivethe manual and explicit selection of the value of the second informationitem subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of the one or moregoals.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the one or more goals of the attacker and (ii) the value of the secondinformation item, to perform the penetration testing campaign using both(i) the manually and explicitly selected one or more goals of theattacker and (ii) the manually and explicitly selected value of thesecond information item.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toan automatic selecting of one or more goals of an attacker of thepenetration testing campaign, the method comprising: a. determining, bythe penetration testing system, a type of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign; b. automatically selecting, by thepenetration testing system and according to the type of the attacker ofthe penetration testing campaign, one or more goals of the attacker; c.executing the penetration testing campaign, by the penetration testingsystem and according to i. the type of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign, and ii. the automatically selected one or more goals,so as to test the networked system; d. reporting, by the penetrationtesting system, at least one security vulnerability determined to existin the networked system by the executing of the penetration testingcampaign, wherein the reporting comprises at least one of (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describingthe at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises automatically determining the type of the attacker by thepenetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises receiving, via the user interface of the computing device, oneor more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the type of theattacker.

In some embodiments, at least one goal of the one or more goalssatisfies at least one condition selected from the group consisting of:i. the at least one goal is a resource-specific goal; ii. the at leastone goal is a file-specific goal; iii. the at least one goal is anode-count-maximizing goal; iv. the at least one goal is afile-count-maximizing goal; v. the at least one goal is anencryption-related goal; vi. the at least one goal is a file-exportinggoal; vii. the at least one goal is a file-size-related goal; viii. theat least one goal is a file-type-related goal; ix. the at least one goalis a file-damage-related goal; and x. the at least one goal is anode-condition-based goal.

In some embodiments, the automatic selecting of one or more goalsincludes performing at least one of a. in response to a determinationthat the attacker type is state-sponsored, automatically selecting agoal to export as many files that are of a file type that may containdrawings as possible; b. in response to a determination that theattacker type is cyber-criminal, automatically selecting a goal toexport as many Excel files as possible.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a goals-selection module configured to: i. determine atype of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign; and ii. based ona result of the determining, automatically select one or more goals ofthe attacker of the penetration testing campaign; b. apenetration-testing-campaign module programmed to perform thepenetration testing campaign according to: i. the type of the attackerof the penetration testing campaign, and ii. the automatically selectedone or more goals; c. a reporting module for reporting at least onesecurity vulnerability determined to exist in the networked systemaccording to results of the penetration testing campaign that isperformed by the penetration-testing-campaign module, wherein thereporting module is configured to report the at least one securityvulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing a display deviceto display a report describing the at least one security vulnerability,and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describing the at leastone security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the goals-selection module is configured toautomatically determine the type of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.

In some embodiments, the goals-selection module is configured todetermine the type of the attacker by receiving, via a user interface ofa computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitlyselect the type of the attacker.

In some embodiments, at least one goal of the one or more goalssatisfies at least one condition selected from the group consisting of:i. the at least one goal is a resource-specific goal; ii. the at leastone goal is a file-specific goal; iii. the at least one goal is anode-count-maximizing goal; iv. the at least one goal is afile-count-maximizing goal; v. the at least one goal is anencryption-related goal; vi. the at least one goal is a file-exportinggoal; vii. the at least one goal is a file-size-related goal; viii. theat least one goal is a file-type-related goal; ix. the at least one goalis a file-damage-related goal; and x. the at least one goal is anode-condition-based goal.

In some embodiments, the goals-selection module is configured to performat least one of the following: a. in response to a determination thatthe attacker type is state-sponsored, a goal to export as many filesthat are of a file type that may contain drawings as possible isautomatically selected; b. in response to a determination that theattacker type is cyber-criminal, a goal to export as many Excel files aspossible is automatically selected.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according to amanually and explicitly-selected lateral movement strategy of anattacker of the penetration testing campaign, the method comprising:receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the user interfaceof the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one ormore manually-entered inputs explicitly selecting the lateral movementstrategy of the attacker of the penetration testing campaign; executingthe penetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided lateral movementstrategy of the attacker, so as to test the networked system; andreporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system by theexecuting of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the reportingcomprises at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, and (ii)electronically transmitting a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select thelateral movement strategy of the attacker, the penetration testingsystem automatically computes and displays an explicit recommendationfor selecting the lateral movement strategy of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the method further comprising: subsequent to thereceiving by the penetration testing system of the one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the lateral movementstrategy of the attacker, receiving, by the penetration testing systemand via the user interface of the computing device, one or moreadditional manually-entered inputs, the one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a value for a secondinformation item of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the secondinformation item is not a lateral movement strategy of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected lateral movement strategy of the attacker.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a lateral-movement-strategy-selection user interfaceincluding one or more user interface components for explicit and manualselection of a lateral movement strategy of an attacker of a penetrationtesting campaign; b. a penetration-testing-campaign module programmed toperform the penetration testing campaign according to the lateralmovement strategy that is manually and explicitly selected via thelateral-movement-strategy-selection user interface; and c. a reportingmodule for reporting at least one security vulnerability determined toexist in the networked system according to results of the penetrationtesting campaign that is performed by the penetration-testing-campaignmodule, wherein the reporting module is configured to report the atleast one security vulnerability by performing at least one of (i)causing a display device to display a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability, and (ii) electronically transmitting a reportdescribing the at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting a lateral movement strategy of the attacker, wherein thelateral-movement-strategy-selection user interface displays the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the lateral movement strategy of the attackerincludes a manual and explicit approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a lateral movement strategy of the attacker, wherein the system isconfigured to receive the manual and explicit selection of the value ofthe second information item subsequent to the manual and explicitselection of the lateral movement strategy.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the lateral movement strategy of the attacker and (ii) the value of thesecond information item, to perform the penetration testing campaignusing both (i) the manually and explicitly selected lateral movementstrategy of the attacker and (ii) the manually and explicitly selectedvalue of the second information item.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according toan automatic selecting of a lateral movement strategy of an attacker ofthe penetration testing campaign, the method comprising: a. determining,by the penetration testing system, at least one of (i) a type of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign and (ii) one or more goalsof the attacker of the penetration testing campaign; b. based on aresult of the determining, automatically selecting by the penetrationtesting system a lateral movement strategy of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign; c. executing the penetration testingcampaign, by the penetration testing system and according to i. the atleast one of the type of the attacker and the one or more goals of theattacker, and ii. the automatically selected lateral movement strategyof the attacker, so as to test the networked system; d. reporting, bythe penetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.

In some embodiments, the determining comprises determining the type ofthe attacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises automatically determining the type of the attacker by thepenetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the determining of the type of the attackercomprises receiving, via the user interface of the computing device, oneor more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the type of theattacker.

In some embodiments, the determining comprises determining the one ormore goals of the attacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the determining of the one or more goals of theattacker comprises automatically determining the one or more goals ofthe attacker by the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the determining of the one or more goals of theattacker comprises receiving, via the user interface of the computingdevice, one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select theone or more goals of the attacker.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. a lateral-movement-strategy-selection module configuredto: determine at least one of (i) a type of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign and (ii) one or more goals of the attackerof the penetration testing campaign; based on a result of thedetermining, automatically select a lateral movement strategy of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign; b. apenetration-testing-campaign module programmed to perform thepenetration testing campaign according to the automatically selectedlateral movement strategy; and c. a reporting module for reporting atleast one security vulnerability determined to exist in the networkedsystem according to results of the penetration testing campaign that isperformed by the penetration-testing-campaign module, wherein thereporting module is configured to report the at least one securityvulnerability by performing at least one of (i) causing a display deviceto display a report describing the at least one security vulnerability,and (ii) electronically transmitting a report describing the at leastone security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to determine the type of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to automatically determine the type of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to determine the type of the attacker by receiving, via auser interface of a computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs that explicitly select the type of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to determine the one or more goals of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to automatically determine the one or more goals of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the lateral-movement-strategy-selection module isconfigured to determine the one or more goals of the attacker byreceiving, via a user interface of a computing device, one or moremanually-entered inputs that explicitly select the one or more goals ofthe attacker.

A method of penetration testing of a networked system by a penetrationtesting system that is controlled by a user interface of a computingdevice so that a penetration testing campaign is executed according tomanually and explicitly-selected sensitivity to detection of an attackerof the penetration testing campaign, the method comprising: receiving,by the penetration testing system and via the user interface of thecomputing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a level of sensitivity todetection of the attacker of the penetration testing campaign; executingthe penetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the levelof sensitivity to detection of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem; and reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least onesecurity vulnerability determined to exist in the networked system bythe executing of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the reportingcomprises at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, and (ii)electronically transmitting a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the method is carried out so that before receivingthe one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the levelof sensitivity to detection of the attacker, the penetration testingsystem automatically computes and displays an explicit recommendationfor selecting the level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the received one or more manually-entered inputscomprises an explicit user approval of the explicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, further comprising: subsequent to the receiving bythe penetration testing system of the one or more manually-enteredinputs that explicitly select the level of sensitivity to detection ofthe attacker, receiving, by the penetration testing system and via theuser interface of the computing device, one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs, the one or more additional manually-enteredinputs explicitly selecting a value for a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the second information item is nota level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignis performed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected valuefor the second information item, and (ii) the manually and explicitlyselected level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection between twopre-defined alternative levels.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection from a list ofmultiple pre-defined levels, the list containing at least three levels.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection in which anyvalue from a pre-defined numerical interval may be selected.

A system for penetration testing of a networked system, the systemcomprising: a. an attacker-sensitivity-selection user interfaceincluding one or more user interface components for manual and explicitselection of a level of sensitivity to detection of an attacker of apenetration testing campaign; b. a penetration-testing-campaign moduleprogrammed to perform the penetration testing campaign whose attackerhas the level of sensitivity to detection that is manually andexplicitly selected via the attacker-sensitivity-selection userinterface; and c. a reporting module for reporting at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system according toresults of the penetration testing campaign that is performed by thepenetration-testing-campaign module, wherein the reporting module isconfigured to report the at least one security vulnerability byperforming at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, and (ii)electronically transmitting a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a recommendationmodule configured to automatically compute an explicit recommendationfor selecting the level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker,wherein the attacker-sensitivity-selection user interface displays theexplicit recommendation.

In some embodiments, the system is configured so that the manual andexplicit selection of the level of sensitivity to detection of theattacker includes a manual and explicit approval of the explicitrecommendation.

In some embodiments, the system further comprises a second userinterface including one or more user interface components for manual andexplicit selection of a value of a second information item of thepenetration testing campaign, the second information item being otherthan a level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker, wherein thesystem is configured to receive the manual and explicit selection of thevalue of the second information item subsequent to the manual andexplicit selection of the level of sensitivity to detection.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign module isconfigured, subsequent to the manual and explicit selection of both (i)the level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker and (ii) the valueof the second information item, to perform the penetration testingcampaign using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker and (ii) the manually andexplicitly selected value of the second information item.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection between twopre-defined alternative levels.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection from a list ofmultiple pre-defined levels, the list containing at least three levels.

In some embodiments, the manual and explicit selection of the level ofsensitivity to detection of the attacker is a selection in which anyvalue from a pre-defined numerical interval may be selected.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system.

FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a related flow-chart.

FIG. 2 (PRIOR ART) illustrates a prior art computing device.

FIG. 3 (PRIOR ART) illustrates a timeline related to the prior-artexample of FIGS. 4A-4D.

FIGS. 4A-4D (PRIOR ART) illustrate a prior art example wherenetwork-nodes are compromised during a penetration test.

FIGS. 5A-5D illustrate an example where network-nodes are compromisedduring a penetration test that is set-up in according to someembodiments of the invention.

FIG. 7 illustrates a timeline related to the example of FIG. 8A.

FIGS. 8A-8B, 10A-10B, 13A-13B, 15A-15B, 17A-17B, 19A-19B, 22A-22Billustrate user engagements of user interfaces according to embodimentsof the invention.

FIGS. 6, 9, 11A-11C, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23 and 26-31 are flowcharts of methods of penetration testing of a networked system accordingto different embodiments of the invention.

FIGS. 24A-24B are two block diagrams showing examples of configurationsof networked systems that are being tested by a penetration testingsystem code module (PTSCM).

FIG. 25 is a block diagram of one example of a penetration testingsystem code module.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

This disclosure should be interpreted according to the definitions inthe “Definitions Section” at the end of the specification. In case of acontradiction between the definitions in the “Definitions Section” atthe end of the specification and other sections of this disclosure, the“Definitions Section” at the end of the specification section shouldprevail.

In case of a contradiction between the “Definitions Section” at the endof the specification and a definition or a description in any otherdocument, including in another document incorporated in this disclosureby reference, the “Definitions Section” at the end of the specificationshould prevail, even if the definition or the description in the otherdocument is commonly accepted by a person of ordinary skill in the art.

Embodiments of the invention relate to penetration testing of networkedsystems, such as that illustrated in FIG. 4A.

Penetration testing systems test networked systems. For example, thenetworked system comprises a plurality of network nodes (referred tosimply as “nodes”) in communication with each other—e.g. see FIG. 4A.

In prior art penetration testing systems (e.g. see the example discussedabove with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4A-4D), a penetration testingcampaign performs or emulates an attack of a potential attacker,starting from an initial state in which no network node of the testednetworked system is compromised. The attacker is assumed to start bycompromising a first network node (e.g. node N122 of FIG. 4B), then totake advantage of the already-compromised first node and compromise asecond network node, then to take advantage of the already-compromisedfirst and second nodes and compromise a third network node, and so on.

However, in some cases this way of operation does not satisfy the user'sneeds. The user may want to learn what might an attacker be able toachieve if s/he starts her/his attack with one or more specific nodesalready under her/his control. This may be useful, for example, whenevaluating the damages that might be incurred if the attacker is anemployee of the organization owning the tested networked system thatalready controls his own network node. Another example is when knowingin advance that one or more given nodes are prone to being compromised(e.g. because they are accessible by the public) and evaluating therisks to the rest of the networked system after the one or more givennodes are compromised.

Therefore, it is useful to let a user of a penetration testing system toselect one or more network nodes that will be assumed to be alreadycompromised and under the control of the attacker when the penetrationtesting campaign starts. Such nodes are called herein“initially-compromised” or “initially-red” network nodes. Wheninitially-compromised nodes are selected for a penetration testingcampaign, these nodes are the only nodes that are assumed to be alreadycompromised when the campaign starts. In other words, a node that is notselected to be an initially-compromised node for a campaign is assumedto be non-compromised when the campaign starts. An example related toinitially-compromised nodes is presented below with reference to FIGS.5A-5D.

In contrast to conventional penetration testing systems (i.e. wherepenetration testing campaigns are performed from an initial state inwhich no network node of the tested networked system is compromised), ina first embodiment of the invention the user manually and explicitlyselects one or more nodes of the tested networked system asinitially-compromised nodes. The skilled artisan is directed to FIGS.6-7 and 8A-8B. The term ‘explicitly selecting’ is defined below—see“III” of the Definitions Section.

In contrast to conventional penetration testing systems (i.e. wherepenetration testing campaigns are performed from an initial state inwhich no network node of the tested networked system is compromised), ina second embodiment of the invention, before penetration testing,initially-compromised nodes are defined by the user as follows: the usermanually and explicitly selects a Boolean node-selection conditiondefining which nodes or nodes are initially compromised. Any networknode of the networked system that satisfies the Boolean condition isconsidered initially compromised. The skilled artisan is directed toFIGS. 9 and 10A-10B.

In contrast to conventional penetration testing systems (i.e. wherepenetration testing campaigns are performed from an initial state inwhich no network node of the tested networked system is compromised), ina third embodiment of the invention, the penetration testing systemautomatically selects one or more of the nodes that is to be consideredinitially-compromised. This selection may be performed, for example,according to features discussed with reference to FIGS. 11A-11C. Theterm ‘automatically selecting’ is defined below—see “mmm” of theDefinitions Section.

It is appreciated that the first, second and/or third embodiments may becombined in any manner.

A Discussion of the Example of FIGS. 5A-5D

Before discussing the first, second and third embodiments, an examplerelated to initially-compromised nodes in general is now discussed withreference to FIGS. 5A-5D.

In contrast to the user-case of FIGS. 4A-4B where a campaign emulates anattack of a potential attacker, starting from an initial state in whichno network node of the tested networked system is compromised, in theexample of FIGS. 5A-5D, it is assumed that three nodes areinitially-compromised: nodes N110, N108 and N117—this is designated bythe ‘brick’ pattern.

According to the example illustrated in FIGS. 5A-5D, initially, at timeT_(Begin Pen-Test), when the penetration test begins, network-nodesN110, N108 and N117 are assumed to have been compromised. Between timeT_(Begin Pen-Test) and T¹ _(During Pen-Test), network nodes N111, N112,N106, N122 and N125 are compromised—this is indicated in FIG. 5B by theX's. Between time T¹ _(During Pen-Test) and T² _(During Pen-Test),network nodes N116 and N101 are compromised, as indicated by the X's inFIG. 5C. Between time T² _(During Pen-Test) and T³ _(During Pen-Test),network node N104 and is compromised, as indicated by the X's in FIG.5D.

The networked system example of FIGS. 4A and 5A have a structure of amathematical tree, in which there are no loops. Such example wasselected for simplifying the figure and its explanation, but is notintended to limit the scope of the invention in any way. The inventionis equally applicable to networked systems containing loops of networknodes in which each pair of nodes that are adjacent to each other in theloop are immediate neighbors. The inventions is also equally applicableto networked systems containing sub-networks comprising of many nodes,in which each two nodes belonging to the same sub-network are immediateneighbors. The invention is also equally applicable to networked systemscontaining any combination of trees, loops, sub-networks and otherarrangements of network nodes.

A Discussion of FIG. 6, 7, 8A-8B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to One or More Manually and Explicitly Selected Network Nodes

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a method of penetration testing of a networkedsystem by a penetration testing system that is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device so that a penetration testing campaignis executed according to a manual and explicit selecting of one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system.

In one example, the selecting is performed using the GUI element 330E ofFIG. 8A. that illustrates a first example of the method of FIG. 6 (alsosee the timeline of FIG. 7); FIG. 8B illustrates a second example of themethod of FIG. 6. In both the first and second example the user canmanually and explicitly select a set of nodes as initially-compromisedthat match the nodes of the example of FIGS. 5A-5D, illustrated by thebrick-pattern.

In step S501 of FIG. 6, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of the computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where: (i) the one or more manually-enteredinputs explicitly selects the one or more network nodes of the networkedsystem and (ii) at least one of the manually and explicitly selectednodes is other than the computing device.

In Frame 1 of FIG. 8A, GUI element 330E of FIG. 8A illustrates 10buttons (illustrated as empty circles), each of which is associated witha different network node (i.e. within the topology of the examples ofFIGS. 5A-5D). Frames 1-4 of FIG. 8A illustrate the state of GUI element330E at times t1-t4 (which are also shown on the timeline of FIG. 7).Frame 5 of FIG. 8A illustrates an action performed at time t5 using GUIelement 334. In all frames of FIG. 8A, UE is an abbreviation for ‘userengagement’—this relates to a user engagement of a GUI element. Forexample, the user provides a mouse click (e.g. depressing a mousebutton) when a mouse pointer is located in a specific location of theGUI element. The skilled artisan will appreciate that a mouse click isjust one example of a user engagement of a GUI element or portionthereof. In another example, a mouse-pointer points to an elementwithout any need for a mouse-click; in another example, a user toucheswith his or her finger (or with a stylus) a GUI element for ‘userengagement’.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user clicks on the button labelled N117 tomanually and explicitly select node N117. In Frame t3, at time t3 theuser clicks on the button labelled N108 to manually and explicitlyselect node N108. In Frame t4, at time t4 the user clicks on the buttonlabelled N110 to manually and explicitly select node N110.

In Frame 5 of FIG. 8A at time t5, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S505 and S509 of FIG. 6, discussed below.

FIG. 8B illustrates a second non-limiting example related to step S501of FIG. 6. Frame 1 illustrates an initial state of a GUI elementdisplaying a portion of the network. In Frame 2, the penetration testingsystem provides a recommendation for three ‘candidate’network-nodes—nodes N105, N110 and N117. The recommended nodes areillustrated in gray stripes. At time t2 of Frame 2, the user accepts therecommendation using GUI element 328F, thereby manually and explicitlyselecting these three network nodes. Thus, in Frame 3 at time t3, themanually and explicitly selected nodes are illustrated in black.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 8B at time t4, the user clicks on ‘begin’ button 334,thereby triggering steps S505 and S509 of FIG. 6, discussed below.

One feature of step S501 is that at least one of the automaticallyselected network nodes is other than the computing device. This isclearly satisfied in the example of FIG. 8A where three distinct networknodes are selected. However, when a single network node is selected,this network note must be different than the “computer device” mentionedin step S501.

In step S505 of FIG. 6, the following is performed: in accordance withthe manual and explicit selecting of the network nodes executing thepenetration testing campaign by the penetration testing system so as totest the networked system, the penetration testing campaign beingexecuted under the assumption that the manually and explicitly selectedone or more network nodes of the networked system are alreadycompromised at the time of beginning the penetration testing campaign.

In step S509 of FIG. 6, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S501 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

Step S501 of FIG. 6 (along with steps S551 of FIG. 9, S811 of FIG. 11A,S821 of FIG. 11B, S801 of FIG. 11C, S301 of FIG. 12, S1351 of FIG. 14,S351 of FIG. 16, S601 of FIG. 18, S901 of FIG. 20, S401 of FIG. 21 andS851 of FIG. 23) refers to a penetration testing system. In one example,the penetration testing system may include the hardware and softwarecomponents of the user-interface used for providing the user input—e.g.for providing GUI element 330E. In another example, the penetrationtesting system receives the user input from a user-interface that isexternal to the penetration testing system.

A Discussion of FIGS. 9 and 10A-10B—a Method of Penetration Testingwhere the User Manually and Explicitly Selects a Boolean Node SelectionCondition

As noted above, some embodiments relate to methods and apparatus whereuser-input manually and explicitly designates one or more nodes of thenetworked system as initially-compromised—e.g. see the example of FIGS.5A-5D.

FIGS. 9 and 10A-10B relate to a second method where the user manuallyprovides input for selecting which nodes (e.g. nodes N110, N108 and N117of FIGS. 5A-5D) are assumed to be initially compromised.

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects a Booleannode-selection condition and a penetration testing campaign is performedaccording to the Boolean node-selection condition. FIG. 9 is aflow-chart of a method for penetration testing according to a manuallyand explicitly selected Boolean node-selection condition.

Specific examples of step S551 of the flow-chart of FIG. 9 are discussedbelow with reference to FIGS. 10A-10B.

In step S551 of FIG. 9 the penetration testing system receives (i.e. viathe user interface of the computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsexplicitly selects a Boolean node-selection condition. The manually andexplicitly selected node-selection condition defines a proper subset ofnetwork nodes of the networked system such that any network node of thenetworked system is a member of the subset of network nodes if and onlyif it satisfies the condition.

A first example is presented in FIG. 10A.

Three candidate Boolean node-selection conditions are listed in GUIelement 330F: (i) a first node-selection condition that states that anode is a selected (i.e. to be part of the ‘proper subset’ of networknodes) if and only if the node is a ‘Linux box’ (i.e. it is a computerexecuting Linux); (ii) a second node-selection condition that statesthat a node is a selected (i.e. to be part of the ‘proper subset’ ofnetwork nodes) if and only if the node has a direct connection to theoutside world; and (iii) a third node-selection condition that statesthat a node is a selected (i.e. to be part of the ‘proper subset’ ofnetwork nodes) if and only if the node has an on-board cell-phone modem.

The first node-selection condition relates to software executing by anode; the second node-selection condition relates to a location of thenode within the network; the third node-selection condition relates tohardware resources.

FIG. 10A presents three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,and Frame 3 at time t3.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user. In Frame 2, attime t2 the user selects the third candidate node-selection condition in330F—e.g. the user engagement of GUI element 330F may be provided by amouse-click.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 10A at time t3, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S555 and S559 of FIG. 11, discussed below.

FIG. 10B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof a Boolean node-selection condition defining the initially-compromisednodes of the penetration testing campaign is performed by the useraccepting, by engaging an ‘accept recommendation” button 328F, arecommendation provided by the penetration testing system. Thus, frame 1illustrates an initial step of GUI element 330F, in which GUI element330F presents a recommended node-selection condition, shown in graystripes. In Frame 2, the user accepts the recommendation, therebyeffecting a manual and explicit selection of the “Iff machine hason-board cell-phone modem’ node-selection condition. The user'sselection of Frame 2 is shown in Frame 3, where the condition “Iffmachine has on-board cell-phone modem’ is shown in black.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 10B at time t4, the user clicks on ‘begin’ button334, thereby triggering steps S555 and S559 of FIG. 9, discussed below.

In step S555 of FIG. 9, the following is performed: in accordance withthe manual and explicit setting forth of the node-selection condition,executing the penetration testing campaign by the penetration testingsystem so as to test the networked system, the penetration testingcampaign being executed under the assumption that every node of thesubset of network nodes is already compromised at the time of beginningthe penetration testing campaign.

In step S559 of FIG. 9, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S551 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

In one particular example relating to the example of FIGS. 10A-10B whichparallels the example of FIGS. 5A-5D, none of the nodes has an on-boardcell-phone modem except for the following nodes—N110, N108 and N117.

A number of examples of Boolean node conditions: (example A) machine isa mobile node; (example B) machine is a node with a direct connection tothe outside world; (example C) machine is a node where MS Word isinstalled; (example D) machine is a Linux node; (example E) machine is anode with Windows 7.0 or lower; (example F) machine is a node physicallysituated in the State of California; (example G) machine provides FTPservices to other nodes.

Example G is one example of a service dependent condition. Examples D-Eare examples of operating-system (OS) dependent conditions. Example C isan example of a software-application dependent condition.

A Discussion of FIG. 11A

FIG. 11A is a flow chart of a method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system so that a penetrationtesting campaign is executed according to an automatic selecting of oneor more network nodes of the networked system.

In step S811, the following is performed: determining whether one ormore network nodes of the networked system satisfy a pre-defined Booleancondition. Some examples of pre-defined Boolean conditions are listed in330F, discussed above. The Boolean condition is automatically selectedby the penetration testing system. For example, a database may store alist of Boolean conditions, and one is selected randomly every time thepenetration testing campaign is run.

In step S805, the following is performed: based on a result of thedetermining, automatically selecting, by the penetration testing system,the one or more network nodes of the networked system, wherein at leastone of the automatically selected network nodes is other than thecomputing device.

In step S809, the following is performed: in accordance with theautomatically selecting of the network nodes, executing the penetrationtesting campaign by the penetration testing system so as to test thenetworked system, the penetration testing campaign being executed underthe assumption that the automatically selected one or more network nodesof the networked system are already compromised at the time of beginningthe penetration testing campaign.

In step S813 of FIG. 11A, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) a report describing the atleast one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIG. 11B

A “type of an attacker” is defined as a classification of the attackerthat indicates its main incentive in conducting attacks of networkedsystems. Typical values for a type of an attacker are state-sponsored,opportunistic cyber criminal, organized cyber criminal and insider.

An attacker can have only a single type.

Some embodiments relate to methods and systems where one or more nodesare automatically selected by the penetration testing system accordingto a type of attacker. The type of attacker can be determined in anymanner—e.g. according to user-input or automatically or in any othermanner.

In one example, whenever it is determined that an attacker is statesponsored, nodes that operate Windows 7 are assumed to be initiallycompromised. In another example, whenever it is determined that theattacker is an insider, nodes that are physically located in fieldoffices and not within the corporate headquarters are assumed to beinitially compromised.

In step S821, the following is performed: determining S821, by thepenetration testing system a type of an attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.

Also appearing in FIG. 11B are steps S805, S809, and S813, discussedabove. These steps are the same steps as in FIG. 11A, and are notexplained again.

A Discussion of FIG. 11C

FIG. 11C is a flow chart of a method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system so that a penetrationtesting campaign is executed according to an automatic selecting of oneor more network nodes of the networked system.

In step S801, the following is performed: determining, by thepenetration testing system, at least one of (i) a type of an attacker ofthe penetration testing campaign, and (ii) whether one or more networknodes of the networked system satisfy a pre-defined Boolean condition.The type of attacker can be determined in any manner—e.g. according touser-input or automatically or in any other manner.

Also appearing in FIG. 11B are steps S805, S809, and S813 discussedabove.

A Discussion of FIGS. 12 and 13A-13B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to One or More Manually and Explicitly Selected Capabilitiesof an Attacker of a Penetration Testing Campaign (e.g. Using GUI Element330A)

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects one or morecapabilities of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign. FIG. 12is a flow-chart of a method for performing penetration testing accordingto manually and explicitly selected capabilities of an attacker of apenetration testing campaign.

Specific examples of step S301 of the flow-chart of FIG. 12 arediscussed below with reference to FIGS. 13A-13B.

The term ‘capability’ of an attacker is defined below—see “z” of the‘Definitions Section.’

In step S301 of FIG. 12, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of a computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsare explicitly selecting one or more capabilities of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

A first example is presented in FIG. 13A which relates to the example ofthe GUI element 330A.

Three attacker capabilities are listed in GUI element 330A: (i) theability to copy a local file and export it to the attacker—if the userselects “YES” then the subsequent penetration testing campaign isperformed in step S305 such that the attacker is assumed to have thiscapability; (ii) the ability to remotely collect database (DB)information (info) form the SQL-server of Microscoft®—if the userselects “YES” then the subsequent penetration testing campaign isperformed in step S305 such that the attacker is assumed to have thiscapability; and (iii) the ability to force remote code execution(RCE)—if the user selects “YES” then the subsequent penetration testingcampaign is performed in step S305 such that the attacker is assumed tohave this capability.

FIG. 13A presents three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,and Frame 3 at time t3. In FIG. 13A the default values are indicated bya gray ‘wave’ shading.

Frame 1 of FIG. 13A illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) whereonly default values are presented as follows: (i) the attacker lacks theability to copy a local file and export it to an attacker (i.e. “N”);(ii) the attacker lacks the ability to remotely collect database (DB)information from SQL server (i.e. “N”); and (ii) the attacker has theability to force remote code execution (RCE) (i.e. “Y”).

In Frame 2 of FIG. 13A at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 330A(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle next to thecapability labeled “Ability to remotely collect DB info from SQL-server)to override the default value, changing from “NO” to “YES.”

In Frame 3 of FIG. 13A at time t3, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S305 and S309 of FIG. 12, discussed below.

FIG. 13B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof the one or more capabilities of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign is performed by the user accepting, by engaging an‘accept recommendation” button 328A, a recommendation provided by thepenetration testing system.

Frame 1 of FIG. 13B illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) ofGUI element 330A’ where only system-recommended values are presented asfollows: (i) the attacker has the ability to copy a local file andexport it to an attacker (i.e. “Y”); (ii) the attacker lacks the abilityto remotely collect database (DB) information from SQL server (i.e.“N”); and (iii) the attacker lacks the ability to force remote codeexecution (RCE) (i.e. “N”). Thus, the {Y,N,N} values are illustrated indiagonal gray lines, indicating that these values have not been manuallyand explicitly selected by the user—in the initial state of FIG. 13A,the {Y,N,N} values are only system-generated recommendations.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 13B at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 328Aby clicking on the circle labelled ‘accept recommendation’ to accept thesystem-recommended values presented in Frame 1 of FIG. 13B.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 13B, the values {Y,N,N} that were previously (i.e. inFrame 1) presented in gray diagonal shading (i.e. when they were onlysystem-recommended values) are now presented in solid black. Because theuser manually and explicitly accepted the system-generatedrecommendations in Frame 2, the values {Y,N,N} are now manually andexplicitly selected values, and are presented as such in Frame 3 of FIG.13B. It should be noted that the user is not forced to accept thesystem-generated recommendations, but may override them. This freedom ofchoice is what makes the selection of the attacker capabilities a manualand explicit selection. If the user would not have an option ofoverriding the system's recommendations, then their selection would notbe considered a manual and explicit selection.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 13B, the user clicks on the ‘begin’ button to beginthe penetration testing campaign using the manually and explicitlyselected {Y,N,N} values.

In step S305 of FIG. 12, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the oneor more capabilities of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem.

In step S309 of FIG. 12, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S301 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIGS. 14 and 15A-15B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to a Manually and Explicitly Selected Level of Sensitivity toDetection of an Attacker of a Penetration Testing Campaign (e.g. UsingGUI Element 330B)

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects a level ofsensitivity to detection of an attacker of a penetration testingcampaign.

The term ‘level of sensitivity to detection of an attacker’ is definedbelow—see “cc” of the ‘Definitions Section’.

FIG. 14 is a flow-chart of a method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system that is controlled by auser interface of a computing device so that a penetration testingcampaign is executed according to manually and explicitly-selected levelof sensitivity to detection of an attacker of the penetration testingcampaign.

Specific examples of step S1351 of the flow-chart of FIG. 14 arediscussed below with reference to FIGS. 15A-15B.

In step S1351 of FIG. 14, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of a computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsare explicitly selecting a level of sensitivity to detection of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign.

A first example is presented in FIG. 15A which relates to the example ofthe GUI element 330B.

GUI element 330B allows for the user to manually and explicitly select alevel of sensitivity of the attacker to being detected (e.g. typically‘lone-wolf’ or ‘free-wheeling’ attackers have ‘less to lose’ if detectedwhile state-sponsored attackers are more sensitive to being detected).

For the particular example of FIG. 15A, the user may select ‘highlysensitive’ (HS), ‘moderately sensitive’ (MS) or ‘not sensitive’(NS)—ifthe user selects “highly sensitive” then the subsequent penetrationtesting campaign is performed in step S1355 in a manner where theattacker is constrained to be highly sensitive, if the user selects“moderately sensitive” then the subsequent penetration testing campaignis performed in step S1355 in a manner where the attacker is constrainedto be moderately sensitive, if the user selects “not sensitive” then thesubsequent penetration testing campaign is performed in step S1355 in amanner where the attacker is not sensitive to being detected.

FIG. 15A presents three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,and Frame 3 at time t3.

Frame 1 of FIG. 15A illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) whereonly a default value is selected as follows: the attacker is moderatelysensitive to being detected (i.e. “MS”).

In Frame 2 of FIG. 15A at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 330B(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle below thewords ‘highly sensitive’) to override the default value of thesensitivity, changing from “MS” to “HS.”

In Frame 3 of FIG. 15A at time t3, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S1355 and S1359 of FIG. 14 using the manuallyand explicitly selected value {“HS”}.

FIG. 15B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof the level of sensitivity to detection of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign is performed by the user accepting, byengaging an ‘accept recommendation” button 328B, a recommendationprovided by the penetration testing system.

Frame 1 of FIG. 15B illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) ofGUI element 330B′ where only a system-recommended value is presented asfollows: the attacker is highly sensitive to being detected (i.e. “HS”value).

Thus, the {HS} value is illustrated in diagonal gray lines, indicatingthat this value has not been manually and explicitly selected by theuser—in the initial state of FIG. 15B, the {HS} value is only asystem-generated recommendation.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 15B at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 328Bby clicking on the circle labelled ‘accept recommendation’ to accept thesystem-recommended value presented in Frame 1 of FIG. 15B.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 15B, the value {HS} that was previously (i.e. inFrame 1) presented in gray diagonal shading (i.e. when it was only asystem-recommended value) is now presented in solid black. Because theuser accepted the system-generated recommendations in Frame 2, the value{HS} is now a manually and explicitly selected value, and is presentedas such in Frame 3 of FIG. 15B. It should be noted that the user is notforced to accept the system-generated recommendation, but may overridethem. This freedom of choice is what makes the selection of theattacker's level of sensitivity to detection a manual and explicitselection.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 15B, the user clicks on the ‘begin’ button to beginthe penetration testing campaign using the manually and explicitlyselected {HS} value.

In step S1355 of FIG. 14, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the levelof sensitivity to detection of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem.

In step S1359 of FIG. 14, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S1351 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIGS. 16 and 17A-17B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to One or More Manually and Explicitly Selected Traits of anAttacker of a Penetration Testing Campaign (e.g. Using GUI Element 330H)

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects one or moretraits of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign. FIG. 16 is aflow-chart of a method for penetration testing according to manually andexplicitly-selected traits of an attacker of a penetration testingcampaign.

Specific examples of step S351 of the flow-chart of FIG. 16 arediscussed below with reference to FIGS. 17A-17B.

The term ‘trait’ of an attacker is defined below—see “bb” of the‘Definitions Section.’

In step S351 of FIG. 16, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of a computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsare explicitly selecting one or more traits of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

A first example is presented in FIG. 17A which relates to the example ofthe GUI element 330H.

Two attacker traits are listed in GUI element 330H: (i) how sensitivethe attacker is to being detected (e.g. typically ‘lone-wolf’ or‘free-wheeling’ attackers have ‘less to lose’ if detected whilestate-sponsored attackers are more sensitive to being detected); and(ii) how resilient the attacker is against initial failure—i.e. oftenwhen an attacker tries to accomplish a goal, the attacker may initiallyfail—more resilient attackers are willing to make more attempts evenwhen previous attempts failed.

For the first trait, the user may select ‘highly sensitive’ (HS),‘moderately sensitive’ (MS) or ‘not sensitive’(NS)—if the user selects“highly sensitive” then the subsequent penetration testing campaign isperformed in step S355 in a manner where the attacker is constrained tobe highly sensitive, if the user selects “moderately sensitive” then thesubsequent penetration testing campaign is performed in step S355 in amanner where the attacker is constrained to be moderately sensitive, ifthe user selects “not sensitive” then the subsequent penetration testingcampaign is performed in step S355 in a manner where the attacker is notsensitive to being detected.

For the second trait, the user may select ‘very resilient’ (VR),‘moderately resilient’ (MR) and ‘not resilient’ (NR).

FIG. 17A presents four frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,Frame 3 at time t3 and Frame 4 at time t4.

Frame 1 of FIG. 17A illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) whereonly default values are presented as follows: (i) the attacker ismoderately sensitive to being detected (i.e. “MS”); (ii) the attacker ismoderately resilient against initial failure (i.e. “MR”).

In Frame 2 of FIG. 17A at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 330H(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle below thewords ‘highly sensitive’) to override the default value of thesensitivity, changing from “MS” to “HS.”

In Frame 3 of FIG. 17A at time t3, the user engages the GUI element 330H(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle below thewords ‘not resilient’) to override the default value of the resiliency,changing from “MR” to “NR.”

In Frame 4 of FIG. 17A at time t4, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S355 and S359 of FIG. 16 using the manually andexplicitly selected values {“HS,“NR”}, discussed below.

FIG. 17B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof the traits of the attacker of the penetration testing campaign isperformed by the user accepting, by engaging an ‘accept recommendation”button 328B, a recommendation provided by the penetration testingsystem.

Frame 1 of FIG. 17B illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) ofGUI element 330H’ where only system-recommended values are presented asfollows: (i) the attacker is highly sensitive to being detected (i.e.“HS” value); (ii) the attacker is moderately resilient against initialfailure (“MR” value).

Thus, the {HS,MR} values are illustrated in diagonal gray lines,indicating that these values have not been manually and explicitlyselected by the user—in the initial state of FIG. 17B, the {HS,MR}values are only system-generated recommendations.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 17B at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 328Bby clicking on the circle labelled ‘accept recommendation’ to accept thesystem-recommended values presented in Frame 1 of FIG. 17B.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 17B, the values {HS,MR} that were previously (i.e. inFrame 1) presented in gray diagonal shading (i.e. when they were onlysystem-recommended values) are now presented in solid black. Because theuser accepted the system-generated recommendations in Frame 2, thevalues {HS,MR} are now manually and explicitly selected values, and arepresented as such in Frame 3 of FIG. 17B. It should be noted that theuser is not forced to accept the system-generated recommendations, butmay override them. This freedom of choice is what makes the selection ofthe attacker traits a manual and explicit selection.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 17B, the user clicks on the ‘begin’ button to beginthe penetration testing campaign using the manually and explicitlyselected {HS,MR} values.

In step S355 of FIG. 16, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the oneor more traits of the attacker, so as to test the networked system.

In step S359 of FIG. 16, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S351 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIGS. 18 and 19A-19B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to a Manually and Explicitly Selected Lateral MovementStrategy of an Attacker of a Penetration Testing Campaign (e.g. UsingGUI Element 330G)

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects a lateralmovement strategy of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign. FIG.18 is a flow-chart of a method for penetration testing according tomanually and explicitly selected lateral movement strategy of anattacker of a penetration testing campaign.

Specific examples of step S601 of the flow-chart of FIG. 18 arediscussed below with reference to FIGS. 19A-19B.

The term ‘lateral movement strategy’ of an attacker is defined below—see“oo” of the ‘Definitions Section.’

In step S601 of FIG. 18, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of a computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsexplicitly select a lateral movement strategy of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

A first example is presented in FIG. 19A which relates to the example ofthe GUI element 330G of FIG. 19A.

Three lateral movement strategies are listed in GUI element 330G: (i)breadth-first strategy (BFS); (ii) depth-first-strategy (DFS); and (iii)‘random neighbor strategy’ where the movement is from a node to animmediately-neighboring node, the immediately-neighboring node beingselected randomly.

FIG. 19A presents three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,and Frame 3 at time t3.

Frame 1 of FIG. 19A illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) whereonly a default value is presented as follows: the lateral movementstrategy of the attacker is ‘BFS’.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 19A at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 330G(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle below ‘DFS’)to override the default value, changing from “BFS” to “DFS.”

In Frame 3 of FIG. 19A at time t3, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S605 and S609 of FIG. 17 (i.e using the ‘DFS’value), discussed below.

FIG. 19B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof the lateral movement strategy of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign is performed by the user accepting, by engaging an‘accept recommendation” button 328G, a recommendation provided by thepenetration testing system.

Frame 1 of FIG. 19B illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) ofGUI element 330G’ where the system-recommended value is presented asfollows: the lateral-movement strategy of the attacker is “DFS”. This“DFS” value is illustrated in diagonal gray lines, indicating that ithas not been manually and explicitly selected by the user—in the initialstate of FIG. 19B, the “DFS” value is only a system-generatedrecommendation.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 19B at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 328Gby clicking on the circle labelled ‘accept recommendation’ to accept thesystem-recommended value presented in Frame 1 of FIG. 19B.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 19B, the {DFS} value that was previously (i.e. inFrame 1) presented in gray diagonal shading (i.e. when it was only asystem-recommended value) is now presented in solid black. Because theuser accepted the system-generated recommendation in Frame 2, the value{DFS} is now a manually and explicitly selected value, and is presentedas such in Frame 3 of FIG. 19B. It should be noted that the user is notforced to accept the system-generated recommendation, but may overrideit. This freedom of choice is what makes the selection of the lateralmovement strategy a manual and explicit selection.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 19B, the user clicks on the ‘begin’ button to beginthe penetration testing campaign using the manually and explicitlyselected {DFS} value.

In step S605 of FIG. 18, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided lateral movementstrategy of the attacker, so as to test the networked system;

In step S609 of FIG. 18, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S501 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIG. 20

FIG. 20 is a flow chart of a method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system so that a penetrationtesting campaign is executed according to an automatic selecting oflateral movement strategy of an attacker of the penetration testingcampaign.

In step S901 of FIG. 20, the following is performed: determining, by thepenetration testing system, at least one of (i) a type of the attackerof the penetration testing campaign and (ii) one or more goals of theattacker of the penetration testing campaign. The type of attacker canbe determined in any manner—e.g. according to user-input orautomatically or in any other manner. The one or more goals of theattacker can be determined in any manner—e.g. according to user-input orautomatically or in any other manner.

In step S905 of FIG. 20, the following is performed: based on a resultof the determining, automatically selecting by the penetration testingsystem a lateral movement strategy of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.

In step S909 of FIG. 20, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to i. the at least one of the type of the attacker and the oneor more goals of the attacker, and ii. the automatically selectedlateral movement strategy of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem.

In step S913 of FIG. 20, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) a report describing the atleast one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of Goals of an Attacker of a Penetration Testing Game andClassification of Example Goals

The term a ‘goal of an attacker’ is defined below—see “dd” of theDefinitions Section.

Seventeen (17) examples of goals of an attacker are listed below:

-   A. exporting outside the networked system of a file having a    specific file name from a specific network node-   B. exporting outside the networked system of a file having a    specific file name from whatever node of the networked system having    a copy of it.-   C. exporting outside the networked system of a given number of files    from a specific network node.-   D. exporting outside the networked system of a given number of files    from any nodes.-   E. exporting outside the networked system of files having a total    size that is more than a given size.-   F. exporting outside the networked system of files of a specific    type having a total size that is more than a given size.-   G. damaging in a specific way a given number of files.-   H. damaging in a specific way a file having a specific file name in    a specific node.-   I. damaging in a specific way a given number of files having a    specific type.-   J. encrypting a given number of files.-   K. encrypting a file having a specific file name in a specific node.-   L. encrypting a given number of files having a specific type.-   M. compromising a given number of network nodes, without caring    which nodes they are (with the given number of nodes larger than    one).-   N. compromising enough network nodes so that the ratio of the number    of already-compromised nodes to the number of not-yet-compromised    nodes is higher than a given threshold.-   O. compromising enough network nodes so that the difference between    the number of already-compromised nodes and the number of    not-yet-compromised nodes is higher than a given threshold.-   P. compromising a given number of network nodes, all of which are    members of a pre-defined subset of the nodes of the tested networked    system. The pre-defined subset may be, for example, all the nodes    running the Windows 7 Operating system, or all the nodes that are    mobile devices.-   Q. compromising all the network nodes in the networked system that    are members of a pre-defined subset of the nodes of the tested    networked system. The pre-defined subset of nodes may be defined,    for example, by a condition that has to be satisfied by a member    node, such as having a cellular communication channel.

There are many particular species of ‘goals” of an attacker.

Thus, some goals (but not all goals) are resource-specific goals. Theterm ‘resource-specific goal’ is defined below in ‘ee’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q areresource specific goals. In particular, examples A, B, H, and K areresource-specific goals. Examples C-G, I-J, L-Q are notresource-specific goals.

The term ‘file-specific goal’ is defined below in ‘ff’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-specific goals. In particular, examples A, B, H, and K are filespecific goals. Examples C-G, I-J, L-Q are not file-specific goals.

The term ‘node-count-maximizing goal’ is defined below in ‘gg’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arenode-count-maximizing goals. In particular, examples N, O, and Q arenode-count-maximizing goals. Examples A-M and P are notnode-count-maximizing goals.

The term ‘file-count-maximizing goal’ is defined below in ‘hh’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-count-maximizing goals. In particular, examples E and F arefile-count-maximizing goals. Examples A-D, G-Q are notfile-count-maximizing goals.

The term ‘encryption-related goal’ is defined below in ‘ii’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q areencryption-related goals. In particular, examples J-L areencryption-related goals. Examples A-I and M-Q are notencryption-related goals.

The term ‘file-exporting goal’ is defined below in ‘jj’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-exporting goals. In particular, examples A-F are file-exportinggoals. Examples G-Q are not file-exporting goals.

The term ‘file-size-related goal’ is defined below in ‘kk’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-size-related goals. In particular, examples E-F arefile-size-related goals. Examples A-D and G-Q are not file-size-relatedgoals.

The term ‘file-type-related goal’ is defined below in ‘ll’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-type-related goals. In particular, examples F, I and L arefile-size-related goals. Examples A-E, G-H, J-K and M-Q are notfile-type-related goals.

The term ‘file-damage-related goal’ is defined below in ‘mm’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arefile-damage-related goals. In particular, examples G-L arefile-damage-related goals. Examples A-F and M-Q are notfile-damage-related goals.

The term ‘node-condition-based goal’ is defined below in ‘nn’ of theDefinitions Section. Some but not all of the example goals A-Q arenode-condition-based goals. In particular, examples P and Q arenode-condition-related goals. Examples A-O are notnode-condition-related goals.

A Discussion of FIGS. 21 and 22A-22B—a Method of Penetration TestingAccording to One or More Manually and Explicitly Selected Goals of anAttacker of a Penetration Testing Campaign (e.g. Using GUI Element 330C)

In some embodiments, a user manually and explicitly selects one or morecapabilities of an attacker of a penetration testing campaign. FIG. 21is a flow-chart of a method for performing penetration testing accordingto manually and explicitly selected goals of an attacker of apenetration testing campaign.

Specific examples of step S401 of the flow-chart of FIG. 21 arediscussed below with reference to FIGS. 22A-22B.

The term ‘goal of an attacker’ is defined below—see “dd” of the‘Definitions Section.’

In step S401 of FIG. 21, the penetration testing system receives (i.e.via the user interface of a computing device), one or moremanually-entered inputs, where the one or more manually-entered inputsare explicitly selecting one or more goals of the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

A first example is presented in FIG. 22A which relates to the example ofthe GUI element 330C.

Three attacker goals are listed in GUI element 330C: (i) a goal to copya file having a user-specified file-name from a user-specified networknode and export it to the attacker—if the user selects “YES” then thesubsequent penetration testing campaign is performed in step S405 suchthat the attacker is assumed to have this goal; (ii) a goal to encrypt afile having a user-specified file-name residing on a user-specifiednetwork node—if the user selects “YES” then the subsequent penetrationtesting campaign is performed in step S405 such that the attacker isassumed to have this goal; and (iii) a goal to compromise auser-specified number of network nodes without caring which nodes theyare—if the user selects “YES” then the subsequent penetration testingcampaign is performed in step S405 such that the attacker is assumed tohave this goal.

FIG. 22A presents three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2,and Frame 3 at time t3. In FIG. 22A the default values are indicated bya gray ‘wave’ shading.

Frame 1 of FIG. 22A illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) whereonly default values are presented as follows: none of the presentedgoals are goals of the attacker.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 22A at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 330C(e.g. by clicking when a mouse pointer is within the circle next to thecapability labeled “Encrypting a file having a specific file name in aspecific node) to override the default value, changing from “NO” to“YES.” The user also types in the file name and the host-node-ID.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 22A at time t3, when the user's mouse-pointer islocated within the ‘begin’ button 334, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S405 and S409 of FIG. 21, discussed below.

FIG. 22B shows another example, where the manual and explicit selectingof the one or more goals of the attacker of the penetration testingcampaign is performed by the user accepting, by engaging an ‘acceptrecommendation’ button 328C, a recommendation provided by thepenetration testing system.

Frame 1 of FIG. 22B illustrates an initial state (i.e. at time t1) ofGUI element 330C′ where only system-recommended values are presented asfollows: (i) exporting a specific file from a specific node is not agoal of the attacker; (ii) encrypting a file having a specific file namein a specific node is a goal of the attacker and (iii) compromising anumber of network nodes, without caring which network nodes they are isnot a goal of the attacker.

Thus, the {N,Y,N} values are illustrated in diagonal gray lines,indicating that these values have not been manually and explicitlyselected by the user—in the initial state of FIG. 22B, the {N,Y,N}values are only system-generated recommendations.

In Frame 2 of FIG. 22B at time t2, the user engages the GUI element 328Cby clicking on the circle labelled ‘accept recommendation’ to accept thesystem-recommended values presented in Frame 1 of FIG. 22B.

In Frame 3 of FIG. 22B, the values {N,Y,N} that were previously (i.e. inFrame 1) presented in gray diagonal shading (i.e. when they were onlysystem-recommended values) are now presented in solid black. Because theuser accepted the system-generated recommendations in Frame 2, thevalues {N,Y,N} are now manually and explicitly selected values, and arepresented as such in Frame 3 of FIG. 22B. It should be noted that theuser is not forced to accept the system-generated recommendations, butmay override them. This freedom of choice is what makes the selection ofthe attacker goals a manual and explicit selection.

In Frame 4 of FIG. 22B, the user clicks on the ‘begin’ button to beginthe penetration testing campaign using the manually and explicitlyselected {N,Y,N} values.

It should be noted that in the example of FIG. 22B the goal recommendedby the system required specifying a file name and a node ID. In thisexample, the system provides the complete specification of the goal,including values for the file name and the host ID, so that if the userwants to accept the recommendation he only has to select the ‘acceptrecommendation’ button 328C. However, this does not have to be so—inother embodiments when the system recommends a goal of the attacker itdoes not provide values for some or all of the parameters required forspecifying the recommended goal. In such embodiments, if the user wantsto accept the recommendation he has to manually provide values for theparameters of the goal before selecting the ‘accept recommendation’button 328C.

In step S405 of FIG. 21, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to the manually and explicitly-provided selection of the oneor more goals of the attacker, so as to test the networked system.

In step S409 of FIG. 21, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) (for example, from thecomputing device mentioned in step S401 to another computing device) areport describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIG. 23

FIG. 23 is a flow chart of a method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system that is controlled by auser interface of a computing device so that a penetration testingcampaign is executed according to an automatic selecting of one or moregoals of an attacker of the penetration testing campaign.

In step S851 of FIG. 23, the following is performed: determining, by thepenetration testing system, a type of the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign. The type of attacker can be determined in anymanner—e.g. according to user-input or automatically or in any othermanner.

In step S855 of FIG. 23, the following is performed: automaticallyselecting, by the penetration testing system and according to the typeof the attacker of the penetration testing campaign, one or more goalsof the attacker.

In step S859 of FIG. 23, the following is performed: executing thepenetration testing campaign, by the penetration testing system andaccording to i. the type of the attacker of the penetration testingcampaign, and ii. the automatically selected one or more goals, so as totest the networked system.

In step S863 of FIG. 23, the following is performed: reporting, by thepenetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone of (i) causing a display device to display a report describing theat least one security vulnerability, and (ii) electronicallytransmitting (e.g. over a computer network) a report describing the atleast one security vulnerability.

In one example where the reporting comprises causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability, acomputing device that performs the reporting causes a local displaydevice (e.g. either residing in a common housing with the computingdevice that performs the reporting or connected via a local deviceinterface) to display the report. Alternatively or additionally, datadescribing the report may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory,and the reporting step may be completed only after some delay (e.g. evena delay of weeks or months or years).

A Discussion of FIGS. 24A-24B and 25

In the example of FIG. 24A, at least a portion of the penetrationtesting system is implemented by a code module 210 (e.g. comprising oneor more of reconnaissance function code 20, attack function code 30, andreporting function code 40; and additionally comprising user-interfacecode) that resides on and is executed by host computing device(s) 80. Inthis example, the host computing device(s) are external to the networkedsystem to be tested.

In the example of FIG. 24B, at least a portion of the penetrationtesting system code 210 resides on and is executed by one or more of thenetwork nodes 110 of the networked-system to be penetration tested.

One example of a penetration testing system code module 210 is shown inFIG. 25. In FIG. 25, (i) “CM” is an abbreviation for ‘code module’; (ii)UICM is an abbreviation for ‘user interface code module’; (iii) SE is anabbreviation for ‘selection engine’; and (iv) PTSCM is an abbreviationfor penetration testing system code module.

Penetration testing system code module 210 includes one or more of (i.e.any combination of): attacker capability selection user interface codemodule 230A (e.g. which produces GUI element 330A), attacker detectionsensitivity selection user interface code modules 230B (e.g. whichproduces GUI element 330B), attacker goal selection user interface codemodule 230C (e.g. which produces GUI element 330C), attacker typeselection user interface code module 230D (e.g. which produces GUIelement 330D), network node selection user interface code module 230E(e.g. which produces GUI element 330E), node selection condition userinterface code module 230F (e.g. which produces GUI element 330F),lateral movement strategy selection user interface code module 230G(e.g. which produces GUI element 330G), attacker trait selection userinterface code module 230H (e.g. which produces GUI element 330H); nodeselection engine (SE) code module 240A (e.g. for performing step S805discussed above); attacker goal selection engine (SE) code module 240B(e.g. for performing step S855 discussed above); lateral movementstrategy selection engine (SE) code module 240C (e.g. for performingstep S905 discussed above).

Additional Discussion

Embodiments of the invention relate to a penetration testing system thatprovides the user great flexibility in defining the specifications of acampaign he wants to run for testing a networked system. In someembodiments, the user of the penetration testing system can directly andindependently select values for multiple information items of acampaign. This is different from prior art systems in which the userselects a pre-defined scenario from a list of scenarios, and is alsodifferent from prior art systems in which the user indirectly selects apre-defined scenario by selecting a value for one information item ofthe campaign that causes the system to automatically choose a specificpre-defined scenario that is the only available scenario having thatvalue for that information item, or causes the system to automaticallychoose a scenario from a plurality of the available pre-definedscenarios which have that value for that information item. In someembodiments, the user of the penetration testing system can directlyselect the type of the attacker that will be used in a campaign.Specifically, such selection is done without committing to specificvalues of other information items of the campaign according to apre-defined scenario. In other words, after selecting the type ofattacker, the user may for example select the goal of the attackindependently of his type of attacker selection. This is different fromprior art systems in which when the user selects a type of attacker, heis tying his hands by committing to a fully-defined scenario and givingup any options of independently selecting values for other informationitems of the campaign he is initiating. The selection of the type of theattacker is typically done by selecting from a closed list ofalternatives, for example by choosing from a drop-down list. In someembodiments, the user of the penetration testing system can directlyselect the capabilities of the attacker that will be used in a campaign.An attacker may have one or more capabilities. The selection of thecapabilities of the attacker is typically done by selecting from aclosed list of alternatives, for example by marking one or morecheckboxes. The list of alternatives to the user may depend on the typeof the attacker previously selected for the campaign. In someembodiments, the user of the penetration testing system can directlyselect the methods of a capability of the attacker that will be used ina campaign. A capability of an attacker may have one or more methods.The selection of the methods is typically done by selecting from aclosed list of alternatives, for example by marking one or morecheckboxes. The list of alternatives to the user may depend on thespecific type of the attacker and on the specific capability previouslyselected. In some embodiments, the user of the penetration testingsystem can directly select the traits of an attacker that will be usedin a campaign. An attacker may have one or more traits. The selection ofthe traits is typically done by selecting from a closed list ofalternatives, for example by marking one or more checkboxes. The list ofalternatives to the user may depend on the specific type of the attackerpreviously selected for the campaign. In some embodiments, the user ofthe penetration testing system can directly select one or more networknodes of the tested networked system that are assumed to be alreadycompromised at the beginning of the test. Such network nodes arereferred to herein as “initial red network nodes” or “initially rednetwork nodes”. This selection is useful for assessing the penetrationcapability of an attacker to other network nodes of the networked systemonce those one or more initial red network nodes are compromised. Forexample, a CISO of an organization may fear that a specific network nodeof the organization is more prone than other nodes to be compromised,because it is directly facing the external world or because there areemployees with access rights to that specific node that are lesstrustworthy than the other employees of the organization. In such casethe CISO may want to know what might happen if his fears will bejustified and run a specific penetration test for finding the answer.

In some embodiments, the selection of the initial red network nodes maybe done by presenting the user with a graphical map of the networkedsystem in which each network node is shown as a circle identified by aname or by an IP address. Using the graphical map, the user can point,using a mouse or some other pointing device, to each network node to beinitially red and press a button (a pointing device button or a keyboardbutton) for selecting that node to be initially red. Alternatively, theuser may be presented with a list of network nodes identified by a nameor by an IP address, where each node is accompanied by a correspondingcheckbox. Marking a checkbox selects the corresponding node to beinitially red.

In some embodiments, the user also has the option to select that therewill be no initially red nodes, in which case the penetration test willstart with the assumption that none of the network nodes is compromised.

In some embodiments, the user of the penetration testing system canselect the one or more network nodes of the tested networked system thatare assumed to be already compromised at the beginning of the test by anopen definition, rather than by directly identifying those nodes by themethods explained above. By “open definition” it is meant that the userprovides a condition a node must satisfy in order to be selected as aninitial red network node. For example, the user may specify that allnetwork nodes having a direct connection to the outside world areselected to be initially red. Or that all network nodes that arecellular mobile devices are selected to be initially red. Or that allnetwork nodes that are MacBook computers are selected to be initiallyred. Or that all network nodes that are running the Windows XP operatingsystem are selected to be initially red. Or that all network nodeshaving installed Internet Explorer version 8 or earlier are selected tobe initially red.

In some embodiments, the selection condition may be a combination ofmultiple conditions. For example, the user may specify that all networknodes that are both running Windows XP and having installed InternetExplorer version 8 or earlier are selected to be initially red.Additionally, the user may define multiple selection conditions thatoperate in parallel. For example, one condition is that a node isrunning Windows XP, and a second condition is that the a node hasinstalled Internet Explorer version 8 or earlier. The effective resultof having these two selection conditions is equivalent to specifyingthat all network nodes having either Windows XP or having installedInternet Explorer version 8 or earlier are selected to be initially red.Also, the user may be able to define a selection condition by using a“not” operator. For example, the user may select that all user nodesthat do not have a specific anti-virus installed are selected to beinitially red.

In some embodiments, the selection of the initially red network nodesmay be done by the user using a GUI (Graphical User Interface). The GUImay include selection of single alternatives from drop-down closedlists, selection of one or more alternatives from closed lists bymarking checkboxes, selection of logic operators (AND, OR, NOT) forcombining conditions, and any other means required for the user fordefining his selection of initially red network nodes.

In some embodiments, the penetration testing system may be configured torelieve the user from the burden of selecting the condition to besatisfied by the initial red network nodes by automatically determiningwhich nodes are the most likely to be compromised in the networkedsystem, for example because they are the ones facing the external world.In such case the system tells the user which nodes it recommends toselect as the initial red nodes, and the user may then either confirmthe recommendation or disagree with it and make his own selectionaccording to the methods described above.

In some embodiments, the penetration testing system may be configured tocompletely leave the selection of the initial red network nodes in thehands of the system. In such case the system automatically determineswhich nodes it recommends to be selected as the initial red nodes, forexample those nodes of the networked system that are the most likely tobe compromised by the type of attacker previously selected for thecampaign, and then selects those nodes to be the initial red networknodes without asking for user confirmation.

In some embodiments, the user of the penetration testing system candirectly select the goals of the attacker during a campaign. An attackermay have one or more goals in a campaign. The selection of the goals ofthe attacker is typically done by selecting from a closed list ofalternatives, for example by marking one or more checkboxes or byselecting a single goal from a drop-down list. For some goals, inaddition to marking a checkbox or selecting from a drop-down list, theuser also must specify one or more parameters. For example, for the goal“export a specific file from a specific network node” the user shouldspecify the file name and the network node. The list of goals to theuser may depend on the type of the attacker previously selected for thecampaign.

In some embodiments, the user of the penetration testing system candirectly select the lateral movement strategy of the attacker during thecampaign. The selection of the lateral movement strategy is typicallydone by selecting from a closed list of alternatives, for example byselecting a single alternative from a drop-down list. For somestrategies, the user also has to specify a parameter. For example, for alateral movement strategy in which a priority is given to compromisingnetwork nodes satisfying a specific condition, the user has to specifythe condition, possibly selecting it from a second drop-down list thatbecomes operative after the selection of that strategy from the firstdrop-down list. The list of alternatives to the user for selecting thelateral movement strategy may depend on the type of the attacker and onthe goals of the attacker previously selected for the campaign.

In some embodiments, the penetration testing system may be configured torelieve the user from the burden of selecting the lateral movementstrategy by automatically determining the most effective strategy forthe goals previously selected for the campaign. In such case the systemtells the user what lateral movement strategy it recommends to selectfor the campaign, and the user may then either confirm therecommendation or disagree with it and make his own selection accordingto the methods described above.

In some embodiments, the penetration testing system may be configured tocompletely leave the selection of the lateral movement strategy in thehands of the system. In such case the system automatically determinesthe strategy it recommends to be selected for the campaign, for examplethe strategy that is most effective for achieving the goals previouslyselected for the campaign, and then selects that strategy without askingfor user confirmation.

In some embodiments, the user performs all the above selections byoperating a console with a GUI supporting all the functions describedabove. The console is typically associated with a remote computingdevice that includes a processor that executes software implementingpart or all of the penetration testing software functions during theexecution of a campaign. Alternatively, the console may be associatedwith a separate computing device that is different from the remotecomputing device executing the campaign and is in communication with it.

Some embodiments relate to a first method (see FIG. 26) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, a first value    for a first information item of a campaign of the penetration    testing system;-   2. subsequent to the manually selecting the first value, manually    selecting, by the user of the penetration testing system and using    the user interface of the computing device, a second value for a    second information item of the campaign of the penetration testing    system, the manual selection of the second value being independent    of the manual selection of the first value;-   3. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed using the first value for the first    information item and the second value for the second information    item;-   4. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The first information item may be the type of the attacker of thecampaign.

Some embodiments relate to a second method (see FIG. 27) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, a capability    of an attacker of a campaign of the penetration testing system;-   2. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed using the manually selected capability of    the attacker;-   3. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The step of manually selecting the capability may include the followingsteps:

-   -   1. automatically determining, by the penetration testing system,        a recommendation for selecting a capability of the attacker;    -   2. presenting to the user, by the penetration testing system,        the recommended capability;    -   3. manually approving, by the user and using the user interface        of the computing device, to use the recommended capability as a        capability of the attacker of the campaign.

The second method may further comprise:

-   1. subsequent to the manually selecting the capability, manually    selecting, by the user of the penetration testing system and using    the user interface of the computing device, a value for a second    information item of the campaign of the penetration testing system,    where: (i) the second information item is not a capability of the    attacker, (ii) the manual selection of the value is independent of    the manual selection of the capability, and (iii) the executing of    the campaign is also using the value for the second information    item, in addition to using the manually selected capability.

Alternatively, the second method may further comprise:

-   1. subsequent to the manually selecting the capability, manually    selecting, by the user of the penetration testing system and using    the user interface of the computing device, a method of the    capability, where the executing of the campaign is also using the    manually selected method.

Some embodiments relate to a third method (see FIG. 28) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, a trait of an    attacker of a campaign of the penetration testing system;-   2. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed using the manually selected trait of the    attacker;-   3. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The step of manually selecting the trait of the attacker may include thefollowing steps:

-   -   1. automatically determining, by the penetration testing system,        a recommended trait of the attacker;    -   2. presenting to the user, by the penetration testing system,        the recommended trait;    -   3. manually approving, by the user and using the user interface        of the computing device, to use the recommended trait as a trait        of the attacker of the campaign.

Some embodiments relate to a fourth method (see FIG. 29) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, one or more    network nodes of the networked system that are assumed to be already    compromised at the beginning of the campaign of the penetration    testing system;-   2. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed assuming the one or more network nodes are    already compromised at the beginning of the campaign;-   3. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The step of manually selecting the one or more network nodes may includeproviding a condition, where a network node is included in the one ormore network nodes if and only if it satisfies the condition.

Alternatively, the step of manually selecting the one or more networknodes may include the following steps:

-   -   i. automatically determining, by the penetration testing system,        one or more network nodes that are recommended to be assumed to        be already compromised at the beginning of the campaign of the        penetration testing system;    -   ii. presenting to the user, by the penetration testing system,        the recommended one or more network nodes;    -   iii. manually approving, by the user and using the user        interface of the computing device, to use the recommended one or        more network nodes as the one or more network nodes assumed to        be already compromised at the beginning of the campaign.

Some embodiments relate to a fifth method (see FIG. 30) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, a goal of an    attacker of a campaign of the penetration testing system;-   2. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed using the manually selected goal of the    attacker;-   3. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The step of manually selecting the first value for the goal may includethe following steps:

-   -   1. automatically determining, by the penetration testing system,        a recommended value for the goal of the campaign;    -   2. presenting to the user, by the penetration testing system,        the recommended value;    -   3. manually approving, by the user and using the user interface        of the computing device, to use the recommended goal as a goal        of the attacker of the campaign.

Some embodiments relate to a sixth method (see FIG. 31) that is mostuseful for setting up a campaign of penetration testing for reportingsecurity vulnerabilities of a networked system, the campaign beingexecuted by a penetration testing system which is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device, the method comprising:

-   1. manually selecting, by a user of the penetration testing system    and using the user interface of the computing device, a lateral    movement strategy of an attacker of the campaign of the penetration    testing system;-   2. executing, by the penetration testing system, the campaign of the    penetration testing system for testing the networked system, where    the campaign is executed using the manually selected lateral    movement strategy of the attacker;-   3. reporting at least one security vulnerability determined by the    campaign to exist in the networked system, to the computing device    or to another computing device.

The step of manually selecting the lateral movement strategy may includethe following steps:

-   -   1. automatically determining, by the penetration testing system,        a recommended value for the lateral movement strategy of the        campaign;    -   2. presenting to the user, by the penetration testing system,        the recommended value;    -   3. manually approving, by the user and using the user interface        of the computing device, to use the recommended lateral movement        strategy as a lateral movement strategy of the attacker of the        campaign.

Definitions

This disclosure should be interpreted according to the definitionsbelow. In case of a contradiction between the definitions in thisDefinitions section and other sections of this disclosure, this sectionshould prevail. In case of a contradiction between the definitions inthis section and a definition or a description in any other document,including in another document incorporated in this disclosure byreference, this section should prevail, even if the definition or thedescription in the other document is commonly accepted by a person ofordinary skill in the art.

-   -   a. “computing device”—Any device having a processing unit into        which it is possible to install code that can be executed by the        processing unit. The installation of the code may be possible        even while the device is operative in the field or it may be        possible only in the factory.    -   b. “peripheral device”—Any device, whether a computing device or        not, that provides input or output services to at least one        other device that is a computing device. Examples of peripheral        devices are printers, plotters, scanners, environmental sensors,        smart-home controllers, digital cameras, speakers and display        screens. A peripheral device may be directly connected to a        single computing device or may be connected to a communication        system through which it can communicate with one or more        computing devices. A storage device that is (i) not included in        or directly connected to a single computing device, and (ii)        accessible by multiple computing devices, is a peripheral        device.    -   c. “network” or “computing network”—A collection of computing        devices and peripheral devices which are all connected to common        communication means that allow direct communication between any        two of the devices without requiring passing the communicated        data through a third device. The network includes both the        connected devices and the communication means. A network may be        wired or wireless or partially wired and partially wireless.    -   d. “networked system” or “networked computing system”—One or        more networks that are interconnected so that communication is        possible between any two devices of the one or more networks,        even if they do not belong to the same network. The connection        between different networks of the networked system may be        achieved through dedicated computing devices, and/or through        computing devices that belong to multiple networks of the        networked system and also have other functionality in addition        to connecting between networks. The networked system includes        the one or more networks, any connecting computing devices and        also peripheral devices accessible by any computing device of        the networked system. Note that a single network is a networked        system having only one network, and therefore a network is a        special case of a networked system.    -   e. “module”—A portion of a system that implements a specific        task. A module may be composed of hardware, software or any        combination of both. For example, in a module composed of both        hardware and software, the hardware may include a single        computing device or multiple computing devices, and the software        may include software code executed by the single computing        device or by the multiple computing devices.    -   f. “network node a of networked system” or “node of a networked        system”—Any computing device or peripheral device that belongs        to the networked system.    -   g. “security vulnerability of a network node” or “vulnerability        of a network node”—A weakness which allows an attacker to        compromise the network node. A vulnerability of a network node        may be caused by one or more of a flawed configuration of a        component of the network node, a flawed setting of a software        module in the network node, a bug in a software module in the        network node, a human error while operating the network node,        and the like. A weakness that allows an attacker to compromise a        network node only conditionally, depending on current conditions        in the network node or in the networked system in which the        network node resides, is still a vulnerability of the network        node, but may also be referred to as a “potential vulnerability        of the network node”. For example, a vulnerability that        compromises any network node running the Windows 7 Operating        System, but only if the network node receives messages through a        certain Internet port, can be said to be a vulnerability of any        Windows 7 network node, and can also be said to be a potential        vulnerability of any such node. Note that in this example the        potential vulnerability may fail in compromising the node either        because the certain port is not open (a condition in the node)        or because a firewall is blocking messages from reaching the        certain port in the node (a condition of the networked system).    -   h. “security vulnerability of a networked system” or        “vulnerability of a networked system”-A weakness which allows an        attacker to compromise the networked system. A vulnerability of        a networked system may be caused by one or more of a        vulnerability of a network node of the networked system, a        flawed configuration of a component of the networked system, a        flawed setting of a software module in the networked system, a        bug in a software module in the networked system, a human error        while operating the networked system, and the like. A weakness        that allows an attacker to compromise a networked system only        conditionally, depending on current conditions in the networked        system, is still a vulnerability of the networked system, but        may also be referred to as a “potential vulnerability of the        networked system”. For example, if a network node of the        networked has a potential vulnerability then that vulnerability        can be said to be a vulnerability of the networked system, and        can also be said to be a potential vulnerability of the        networked system.    -   i. “vulnerability management”—A cyclical practice of        identifying, classifying, remediating, and mitigating        vulnerabilities of network nodes in a networked system.    -   j. “penetration testing” or “pen testing” (in some references        also known as “red team assessment” or “red team testing”, but        in other references those terms referring to a red team have a        different meaning than “penetration testing”)—A process in which        a networked system is evaluated in order to determine if it can        be compromised by an attacker by utilizing one or more security        vulnerabilities of the networked system. If it is determined        that the networked system can be compromised, then the one or        more security vulnerabilities of the networked system are        identified and reported. Unlike a vulnerability management        process which operates at the level of isolated vulnerabilities        of individual network nodes, a penetration test may operate at a        higher level which considers vulnerabilities of multiple network        nodes that might be jointly used by an attacker to compromise        the networked system. A penetration testing process involves at        least the following functions: (i) a reconnaissance        function, (ii) an attack function, and (ii) a reporting        function. It should be noted that the above functions do not        necessarily operate sequentially according to the above order,        but may operate in parallel or in an interleaved mode. Unless        otherwise explicitly specified, a reference to penetration        testing should be understood as referring to automated        penetration testing.    -   k. “automated penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which        at least one of the reconnaissance function, the attack function        and the reporting function is at least partially automated.    -   l. “penetration testing system”—A system capable of performing        penetration testing, regardless if composed of hardware,        software or combination of both.    -   m. “reconnaissance function” or “recon function”—The function in        a penetration testing process that handles collection of data        about the tested networked system. The collected data may        include internal data of one or more network nodes of the tested        networked system. Additionally, the collected data may include        data about communication means of the tested networked system        and about peripheral devices of the tested networked system. The        collected data may also include data that is only indirectly        related to the tested networked system, for example business        intelligence data about the organization owning the tested        networked system, collected in order to use it for assessing        importance of resources of the networked system. The        functionality of a reconnaissance function may be implemented by        any combination of (i) software executing in a remote computing        device, where the remote computing device may probe the tested        networked system for the purpose of collecting data about        it, (ii) hardware and/or software simulating or duplicating the        tested networked system, (iii) a reconnaissance agent software        module executing in one or more network nodes of the tested        networked system.    -   n. “attack function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles determination of whether one or more        security vulnerabilities exist in the tested networked system.        The determination is based on data collected by the        reconnaissance function of the penetration testing. The attack        function generates data about each of the identified security        vulnerabilities, if any. The functionality of an attack function        may be implemented by any combination of (i) software executing        in a remote computing device, where the remote computing device        may attack the tested networked system for the purpose of        verifying that it can be compromised, (ii) hardware and/or        software simulating or duplicating the tested networked        system, (iii) an attack agent software module executing in one        or more network nodes of the tested networked system. The        methods used by an attack function may include executing a real        attack on the tested networked system by attempting to change at        least one setting, mode or state of a network node or of a        hardware or software component of a network node, in order to        verify that the tested networked system may be compromised. In        such case, the attempt may result in actually compromising the        tested networked system. Alternatively, the methods used by an        attack function may be such that whenever there is a need to        verify whether a setting, a mode or a state of a network node or        of a hardware or software component of a network node can be        changed in a way that compromises the tested networked system,        the verification is done by simulating the effects of the change        or by otherwise evaluating them without ever actually        compromising the tested networked system.    -   o. “reporting function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles reporting of results of the penetration        testing. The reporting comprises at least one of (i) displaying        a report to a user of the computing device implementing the        reporting function, and (ii) transmitting a report from the        computing device implementing the reporting function to another        computing device. The functionality of a reporting function may        be implemented by software executing in a remote computing        device, for example in the computing device implementing the        attack function of the penetration testing.    -   p. “recovery function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles cleaning-up after a penetration test. The        recovery includes undoing any operation done during the        penetration testing process that results in compromising the        tested networked system. The functionality of a recovery        function may be implemented by any combination of (i) software        executing in a remote computing device, for example in the        computing device implementing the attack function of the        penetration testing, (ii) an attack agent software module        executing in one or more network nodes of the tested networked        system.    -   q. “a campaign of penetration testing” or “penetration testing        campaign”—A specific run of a specific test of a specific        networked system by the penetration testing system.    -   r. “results of a penetration testing campaign”—Any output        generated by the penetration testing campaign. This includes,        among other things, data about any security vulnerability of the        networked system tested by the penetration testing campaign that        is detected by the campaign. It should be noted that in this        context the word “results” is used in its plural form regardless        of the amount of output data generated by the penetration        testing campaign, including when the output consists of data        about a single security vulnerability.    -   s. “information item of a campaign”—A variable data item that a        penetration testing system must know its value before executing        the campaign. Note that a data item must be able to have        different values at different campaigns in order to be        considered an information item of the campaign. If a data item        always has the same value for all campaigns, it is not an        information item of the campaign, even if it must be known and        is being used by the penetration testing system when executing        the campaign. An information item of a campaign is either a        primary information item of the campaign or a secondary        information item of the campaign. A type of an attacker and a        goal of an attacker are examples of information items of a        campaign. Another example of an information item of a campaign        that is more complex than the previous two simple examples is a        subset of the network nodes of the networked system that is        assumed to be already compromised at the time of beginning the        penetration testing campaign, with the subset defined either by        an explicit selection of network nodes or by a Boolean condition        each node of the subset has to satisfy. A value of an        information item may be composed either of a simple value or of        both a main value and one or more auxiliary values. If a        specific main value of an information item requires one or more        auxiliary values that complete the full characterization of the        value, then the combination of the main value and the one or        more auxiliary values together is considered to be the value        assigned to the information item. For example, for a “goal of        the attacker” information item, after a user selects a main        value of “exporting a specific file from whatever node having a        copy of it”, the user still has to provide a file name as an        auxiliary value in order for the goal information item to be        fully characterized. In this case the combination of “exporting        a specific file from whatever node having a copy of it” and the        specific file name is considered to be the value of the “goal of        the attacker” information item.    -   t. “primary information item of a campaign”—An information item        of the campaign which is completely independent of previously        selected values of other information items of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a primary information item of the campaign are not        dependent on any value previously selected for any another        information item of the campaign. For example, the options        available to the user for selecting a goal of the attacker are        independent of values previously selected for any other        information item of the campaign, and therefore the goal of the        attacker is a primary information item of the campaign.    -   u. “secondary information item of a campaign”—An information        item of the campaign which depends on at least one previously        selected value of another information item of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a secondary information item of the campaign depend on        at least one value previously selected for another information        item of the campaign. For example, the options available to the        user for selecting a capability of an attacker may depend on the        previously selected value of the type of the attacker. For a        first type of attacker the available capabilities to select from        may be a first group of capabilities, while for a second type of        attacker the available capabilities to select from may be a        second group of capabilities, different from the first group.        Therefore, a capability of the attacker is a secondary        information item of the campaign.    -   v. “specifications of a campaign” or “scenario”—A collection of        values assigned to all information items of the campaign. As        having a value for each information item of a campaign is        essential for running it, a campaign of a penetration testing        system cannot be run without providing the penetration testing        system with full specifications of the campaign. A value of an        information item included in the specifications of a campaign        may be manually selected by a user or may be automatically        determined by the penetration testing system. In the latter        case, the automatic determination by the system may depend on        one or more values selected by the user for one or more        information items of the campaign, or it may be independent of        any selection by the user. For example, the selection of the        capabilities of the attacker may automatically be determined by        the system based on the user-selected type of the attacker, and        the lateral movement strategy of the attacker may be        automatically determined by the system independently of any user        selection.    -   w. “pre-defined scenario”, “scenario template” or “template        scenario”—A scenario that exists in storage accessible to a        penetration testing system before the time a campaign is        started, and can be selected by a user of the penetration        testing system for defining a campaign of penetration testing. A        pre-defined scenario may be created and provided by the provider        of the penetration testing system and may be part of a library        of multiple pre-defined scenarios. Alternatively, a pre-defined        scenario may be created by the user of the penetration testing        system using a scenario editor provided by the provider of the        penetration testing system. A penetration testing system may        require that a campaign of penetration testing that is based on        a pre-defined scenario must have all its values of information        items taken from the pre-defined scenario, with no exceptions.        Alternatively, a penetration testing system may allow a user to        select a pre-defined scenario and then override and change one        or more values of information items of a campaign that is based        on the pre-defined scenario.    -   x. “attacker” or “threat actor”—An entity, whether a single        person, a group of persons or an organization, that might        conduct an attack against a networked system by penetrating it        for uncovering its security vulnerabilities and/or for        compromising it.    -   y. “a type of an attacker”—A classification of the attacker that        indicates its main incentive in conducting attacks of networked        systems. Typical values for a type of an attacker are        state-sponsored, opportunistic cyber criminal, organized cyber        criminal and insider. An attacker can have only a single type.    -   z. “a capability of an attacker”—A tool in the toolbox of the        attacker. A capability describes a specific action that the        attacker can perform. Examples of capabilities are copying a        local file of a network node and exporting it to the attacker        out of the networked system and remotely collecting database        information from an SQL server of the networked system. In some        systems, selecting a type of an attacker causes a corresponding        default selection of capabilities for that type of attacker, but        the user may have an option to override the default selection        and add or delete capabilities. An attacker can have one or        multiple capabilities.    -   aa. “a method of a capability”—A combination of (i) an algorithm        for implementing the capability, and (ii) a required condition        for the capability to be applicable and feasible for an attacker        having that capability. For example, an opportunistic        cyber-criminal may have the knowledge of forcing RCE (Remote        Code Execution) in a browser of a targeted network node using a        simple and well-known algorithm, but that algorithm is only        applicable when the browser is an old version of IE (Internet        Explorer) not higher than a specific version number. On the        other hand, a state-sponsored attacker may have the knowledge of        forcing RCE using a complex and sophisticated algorithm, that        algorithm being applicable to every type of browser and every        version of it. The two attackers both have the same capability        of forcing RCE for browsers, but have different methods for that        capability—for one attacker the RCE capability is implemented by        a first method which is limited to a certain subclass of        browsers, while for the other attacker the RCE capability is        implemented by a second method which is applicable to all        browsers. The condition of a method may be the trivial condition        that is always satisfied, as is demonstrated in the above        example in which a state-sponsored attacker has an RCE        capability with an always-true condition. A capability can have        one or multiple methods.    -   bb. “a trait of an attacker”—A behavioral and non-technical        feature of the attacker that may affect how he conducts his        attack. A trait may be a condition controlling the conducting of        the attack by the attacker. An example of a trait of an attacker        is the sensitivity of the attacker to detection (a.k.a. the        aggression level of the attacker). A state-sponsored attacker        may be assumed to only use his capabilities if the attack can be        hidden and remain undetected by the organization owning the        attacked networked system. On the other hand, an opportunistic        cyber criminal that has the same capabilities and methods may be        assumed to completely ignore considerations of being detected or        not. The two attackers have the same capabilities and methods,        but different values for the sensitivity to detection trait,        that control their operation during the attack. Alternatively, a        trait may have several (more than two) discrete possible values.        For example, the sensitivity to detection trait described above,        may be assigned any one of the values “highly sensitive”,        “moderately sensitive” and “not sensitive”. Alternatively, a        trait may have a value selectable from a continuous scale, for        example from the range [0 . . . 100]. An attacker can have one        or multiple traits.    -   cc. “a level of sensitivity to detection of an attacker” or “an        aggression level of an attacker”—The extent to which the        attacker prefers not to be detected while carrying out his        attack. A high level of sensitivity to detection or a high        aggression level indicate a strong preference for not being        detected. A low level of sensitivity to detection or low        aggression level indicate weak preference for not being        detected. The sensitivity/aggression level may be specified as        one of two possible values (e.g. “sensitive” vs. “not        sensitive”). Alternatively, the sensitivity/aggression level may        be specified as one of several (more than two) discrete possible        values (e.g. “highly sensitive”, “moderately sensitive”,        “moderately not sensitive”, “highly not sensitive”).        Alternatively, the sensitivity/aggression level may be specified        as a value selectable from a continuous scale (e.g. from the        range [0 . . . 10]).    -   dd. “a goal of an attacker”—What the attacker of a campaign is        trying to achieve when attacking a targeted networked system. In        other words, what is the criterion according to which it will be        judged whether the attack was a success or a failure and/or to        what extent was it a success or a failure. Selecting a type of        an attacker may cause a default selection of a goal for that        attacker, but the user may have an option to override the        default selection. An attacker can have one or multiple goals.    -   ee. “a resource-specific goal of an attacker”—A goal of the        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with a        specific resource in the tested networked system. Examples of        resource-specific goals are deleting a specific folder, shutting        down a specific peripheral device, and exporting a specific file        out of the networked system. The specific resource may be        identified by a name (e.g. a file name), an address (e.g. a        network address of a peripheral device), a serial number (e.g. a        serial number of a peripheral device), or in any other way that        unambiguously identifies it. Note that a goal specifying a        resource existing in multiple identical copies in the networked        system (e.g. a file existing in multiple network nodes), where        the attacker does not mind which of the copies is targeted, is a        resource-specific goal.    -   ff. “a file-specific goal of an attacker”—A goal of the attacker        that has a characteristic of being associated with a specific        file in the tested networked system. Examples of file-specific        goals are deleting a specific file, exporting a specific file        out of the networked system, and encrypting a specific file. The        specific file may be identified by a name (e.g. a file name), or        in any other way that unambiguously identifies it. Note that a        goal specifying a file existing in multiple identical copies in        the networked system (e.g. a file existing in multiple network        nodes), where the attacker does not mind which of the copies is        targeted, is a file-specific goal. Also note a file-specific        goal is also a resource-specific goal.    -   gg. “a node-count-maximizing goal of an attacker”—A goal of the        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with        maximizing the number of network nodes satisfying a given        condition. Examples of node-count-maximizing goals are        compromising as many nodes as possible, and encrypting at least        one file on as many nodes as possible. A goal that is associated        with increasing the number of network nodes satisfying a given        condition until a given networked-system-level condition is        satisfied, is also a node-count-maximizing goal. An example of        such goal is compromising enough network nodes so that the ratio        of the number of already-compromised nodes to the number of        not-yet-compromised nodes in the networked system is higher than        a given threshold. However, a goal of compromising a given        number of nodes in the networked system is not a        node-count-maximizing goal, because it does not include a        networked-system-level condition.    -   hh. “a file-count-maximizing goal of an attacker”—A goal of the        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with        maximizing the number of files satisfying a given condition.        Examples of file-count-maximizing goals are exporting out of the        networked system as many files as possible, and encrypting as        many files as possible. A goal that is associated with        increasing the number of files satisfying a given condition        until a given networked-system-level condition is satisfied, is        also a file-count-maximizing goal. An example of such goal is        exporting outside the networked system of files having a total        size that is more than a given size. However, a goal of        exporting a given number of files is not a file-count-maximizing        goal, because it does not include a networked-system-level        condition.    -   ii. “an encryption-related goal of an attacker”—A goal of an        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with        encrypting one or more files. Examples of encryption-related        goals are encrypting a specific file, encrypting as many files        as possible, and encrypting as many files of a specific file        type. Note that an encryption-related goals is also a        file-damage-related goal.    -   jj. “a file-exporting goal of an attacker”—A goal of an attacker        that has a characteristic of being associated with exporting one        or more files out of the networked system. Examples of        file-exporting goals are exporting a specific file, exporting as        many files as possible, and exporting as many files of a        specific type.    -   kk. “a file-size-related goal of an attacker”—A goal of an        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with the        file size of one or more files. Examples of file-size-related        goals are exporting a file larger than 100 Megabytes, exporting        one or more files whose combined size is larger than 100        Megabytes, and encrypting one or more files whose combined size        is larger than 100 Megabytes.    -   ll. “a file-type-related goal of an attacker”—A goal of an        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with a        file type of one or more files. Examples of file-type-related        goals are exporting out of the networked system of as many files        of a given type as possible, and encrypting as many files of a        given type as possible.    -   mm. “a file-damage-related goal of an attacker”—A goal of an        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with        damaging one or more files. Examples of file-damage-related        goals are deleting a specific file, deleting as many files as        possible, and renaming as many files as possible.    -   nn. “a node-condition-based goal of an attacker”—A goal of an        attacker that has a characteristic of being associated with a        Boolean condition applied to network nodes of the tested        networked system. One example of a node-condition-based goal is        compromising a given number of network nodes, all of which are        members of a subset of the nodes of the tested networked system,        where the subset of nodes is defined as all nodes of the tested        networked system satisfying a given condition. The condition may        be, for example, “running the Windows 7 Operating system” or        “being a mobile device”. Another example of a        node-condition-based goal is compromising all the network nodes        that are members of a subset of the nodes of the tested        networked system, where the subset of nodes is defined as all        the nodes of the tested networked system satisfying a given        condition, where the given condition is “having a cellular        communication channel”.    -   oo. “a lateral movement strategy of an attacker”—A decision        logic applied by the attacker of a campaign for selecting the        next network node to try to compromise. A simple example of a        lateral movement strategy is a “depth first” strategy. In such        strategy the next network node to try to compromise is an        immediate neighbor of the last network node that was compromised        that is not yet compromised (provided such neighbor node        exists). Two network nodes are “immediate neighbors” of each        other if and only if they have a direct communication link        between them that does not pass through any other network node.        Another simple example is a “breadth search” strategy. In such        strategy the next network node to try to compromise is a network        node whose distance from the first node compromised by the        campaign is the smallest possible. The distance between two        network nodes is the number of network nodes along the shortest        path between them, plus one. A path is an ordered list of        network nodes in which each pair of adjacent nodes in the list        is a pair of immediate neighbors. Thus the distance between two        immediate neighbors is one. An example of a more advanced        lateral movement strategy is a strategy that is applicable when        a goal of the attacker is related to a resource of the networked        system that resides in a specific network node. In such case the        next network node to try to compromise may be selected by        determining the shortest path in the networked system leading        from an already compromised node to the specific node containing        the desired resource, and picking the first node on this path to        be the next node to try to compromise. Note that if the shortest        path has a length of one (which happens when the specific node        is an immediate neighbor of an already compromised node), then        the next node to try to compromise is the specific node        containing the desired resource. Another example of a lateral        movement strategy is a strategy that gives priority to network        nodes satisfying a specific condition, for example nodes that        are known to have a specific weakness, such as running the        Windows XP operating system. In such case the next node to try        to compromise is a node that satisfies the condition and is also        an immediate neighbor of an already compromised node (if such        node exists). Selecting a type of an attacker may cause a        default selection of a lateral movement strategy for that        attacker, but the user may have an option to override the        default selection. An attacker can only have a single lateral        movement strategy.    -   pp. “penetration testing by simulation” or “simulated        penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which (i) the        functionality of the reconnaissance function is fully        implemented by software executing by a remote computing device        and/or by hardware and/or software simulating or duplicating the        tested networked system, where the remote computing device may        probe the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting        data about it, as long as this is done without risking        compromising the tested networked system, and (ii) the methods        used by the attack function are such that whenever there is a        need to verify whether a setting, a mode or a state of a network        node or of a hardware or software component of a network node        can be changed in a way that compromises the tested networked        system, the verification is done by simulating the effects of        the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   qq. “penetration testing by actual attack” or “actual attack        penetration testing” or “penetration testing by actual exploit”        or “actual exploit penetration testing”—Penetration testing in        which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        fully implemented by (A) software executing in a remote        computing device, where the remote computing device may probe        the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting data        about it even if this risks compromising the tested networked        system, and/or by (B) software executing in one or more network        nodes of the tested networked system that analyzes network        traffic and network packets of the tested networked system for        collecting data about it, and (ii) the methods used by the        attack function include executing a real attack on the tested        networked system by attempting to change at least one setting,        mode or state of a network node or of a hardware or software        component of a network node in order to verify that the tested        networked system may be compromised, such that the attempt may        result in compromising the tested networked system.    -   rr. “penetration testing by reconnaissance agents” or        “reconnaissance agent penetration testing”—Penetration testing        in which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        at least partially implemented by a reconnaissance agent        software module installed and executed in each one of multiple        network nodes of the tested networked system, where the data        collected by at least one instance of the reconnaissance agent        software module includes internal data of the network node in        which it is installed, and the data collected by at least one        instance of the reconnaissance agent software module is at least        partially collected during the penetration testing process,        and (ii) the methods used by the attack function are such that        whenever there is a need to verify whether a setting, a mode or        a state of a network node or of a hardware or software component        of a network node can be changed in a way that compromises the        tested networked system, this is done by simulating the effects        of the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   ss. “reconnaissance client agent”, “reconnaissance agent” or        “recon agent”—A software module that can be installed on a        network node and can be executed by a processor of that network        node for partially or fully implementing the reconnaissance        function of a penetration test. A reconnaissance agent must be        capable, when executed by a processor of the network node in        which it is installed, of collecting data at least about some of        the events occurring in the network node. Such events may be        internal events of the network node or messages sent out of the        network node or received by the network node. A reconnaissance        agent may be capable of collecting data about all types of        internal events of its hosting network node. Also, it may be        capable of collecting other types of data of its hosting network        node. A reconnaissance agent may additionally be capable of        collecting data about other network nodes or about other        components of a networked system containing the hosting network        node. A reconnaissance agent may be persistently installed on a        network node, where “persistently” means that once installed on        a network node the reconnaissance agent survives a reboot of the        network node. Alternatively, a reconnaissance agent may be        non-persistently installed on a network node, where        “non-persistently” means that the reconnaissance agent does not        survive a reboot of the network node and consequently should be        installed again on the network node for a new penetration test        in which the network node takes part, if the network node was        rebooted since the previous penetration test in which it took        part.    -   tt. “attack client agent” or “attack agent”—A software module        that can be installed on a network node and can be executed by a        processor of that network node for partially or fully        implementing the attack function of a penetration test.        Typically, an attack agent is installed by an actual attack        penetration testing system in a network node that it had        succeeded to compromise during a penetration test. Once        installed on such network node, the attack agent may be used as        a tool for compromising other network nodes in the same        networked system. In such case, the attack agent may include        code that when executed by a processor of the compromised        network node compromises another network node that is adjacent        to it in the networked system, possibly taking advantage of the        high level of trust it may have from the point of view of the        adjacent network node. Another type of an attack agent may        include code that when executed by a processor of a network node        determines whether that network node would be compromised if a        given operation is performed.    -   uu. “remote computing device penetration testing software        module”—A software module that implements the full functionality        of a penetration testing system, except for the functionality        implemented by (i) reconnaissance agents, (ii) attack agents,        and (iii) hardware and/or software simulating or duplicating the        tested networked system, if such components are used in the        implementation of the penetration testing system. The remote        computing device penetration testing software module may be        installed and executed on a single computing device or comprise        multiple software components that reside on multiple computing        devices, which are parts of the remote computing device of the        penetration testing system. For example, a first component of        the remote computing device penetration testing software module        may implement part or all of the reconnaissance function and be        installed and executed on a first computing device, a second        component of the remote computing device penetration testing        software module may implement part or all of the attack function        and be installed and executed on a second computing device, and        a third component of the remote computing device penetration        testing software module may implement the reporting function and        be installed and executed on a third computing device.    -   vv. “internal data of a network node”—Data related to the        network node that is only directly accessible to code executing        by a processor of the network node and is only accessible to any        code executing outside of the network node by receiving it from        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        internal data of a network node are data about internal events        of the network node, data about internal conditions of the        network node, and internal factual data of the network node.    -   ww. “internal event of/in a network node”—An event occurring in        the network node whose occurrence is only directly detectable by        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        an internal event of a network node are an insertion of a USB        drive into a port of the network node, and a removal of a USB        drive from a port of the network node. An internal event may be        a free event or a non-free event. It should be noted that the        term “an event of X” refers to any occurrence of an event of the        type X and not to a specific occurrence of it. For referring to        a specific occurrence of an event of type X one should        explicitly say “an occurrence of event of X”. Thus, a software        module which looks for detecting insertions of a USB drive into        a port is “detecting an event of USB drive insertion”, while        after that module had detected such event it may report “an        occurrence of an event of USB drive insertion”.    -   xx. “internal condition of/in a network node”—A Boolean        condition related to the network node which can only be directly        tested by code executing by a processor of the network node.        Examples of an internal condition of a network node are whether        the local disk of the terminal node is more than 98% full or        not, and whether a USB drive is currently inserted in a port of        the network node.    -   yy. “internal factual data of/in a network node” or “internal        facts of a network node”—Facts related to the network node which        can only be directly found by code executing by a processor of        the network node. Examples of factual data of a network node are        the version of the firmware of a solid-state drive installed in        the network node, the hardware version of a processor of the        network node, and the amount of free space in a local disk of        the network node.    -   zz. “resource of a networked system”—A file in a network node of        the networked system, a folder in a network node of the        networked system, credentials of a user of the networked system,        a peripheral device of a network node of the networked system,        or a peripheral device directly attached to a network of the        networked system.    -   aaa. “compromising a network node”—Successfully causing        execution of an operation in the network node that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the network node, or successfully        causing execution of code in a software module of the network        node that was not predicted by the vendor of the software        module. Examples for compromising a network node are reading a        file without having read permission for it, modifying a file        without having write permission for it, deleting a file without        having delete permission for it, exporting a file out of the        network node without having permission to do so, getting an        access right higher than the one originally assigned without        having permission to get it, getting a priority higher than the        one originally assigned without having permission to get it,        changing a configuration of a firewall network node such that it        allows access to other network nodes that were previously hidden        behind the firewall without having permission to do it, and        causing execution of software code by utilizing a buffer        overflow. As shown by the firewall example, the effects of        compromising a certain network node are not necessarily limited        to that certain network node. In addition, executing successful        ARP spoofing, denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle or        session-hijacking attacks against a network node are also        considered compromising that network node, even if not        satisfying any of the conditions listed above in this        definition.    -   bbb. “ARP spoofing”—a technique for compromising a target        network node in which an attacker sends a false Address        Resolution Protocol (ARP) reply message to the target network        node. The aim is to associate an attacker's MAC address (either        a MAC address of the node sending the false ARP reply message or        a MAC address of another node controlled by the attacker) with        the IP address of another host, such as the default gateway,        causing any traffic sent by the target node and meant for that        IP address to be sent to the attacker instead. ARP spoofing may        allow an attacker to intercept data frames on a network, modify        the traffic, or stop all traffic to a certain node. Often the        attack is used as an opening for other attacks, such as        denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, or session-hijacking        attacks.    -   ccc. “denial-of-service attack”—a cyber-attack where an attacker        seeks to make a service provided by a network node to other        network nodes unavailable to its intended users either        temporarily or indefinitely. The denial-of-service attack may be        accomplished by flooding the node providing the targeted service        with superfluous requests in an attempt to overload it and        prevent some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled.        Alternatively, the denial-of-service attack may be accomplished        by causing some or all of the legitimate requests addressed to        the targeted service to not reach their destination.    -   ddd. “man-in-the-middle attack”—a cyber-attack where an attacker        secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between        two network nodes who believe they are directly communicating        with each other. One example of man-in-the-middle attacks is        active eavesdropping, in which the attacker makes independent        connections with the victims and relays messages between them to        make them believe they are communicating directly with each        other, when in fact the entire communication session is        controlled by the attacker. The attacker must be able to        intercept all relevant messages passing between the two victims        and inject new ones.    -   eee. “session-hijacking attack”—a cyber-attack where a valid        communication session between two network nodes in a networked        system is used by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to        information or services in the networked computer system.    -   fff. “compromising a networked system”—Compromising at least one        network node of the networked system or successfully causing        execution of an operation in the networked system that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the networked system. Examples        for operations in the networked system that may not be allowed        are exporting a file out of the networked system without having        permission to do so, sending a file to a network printer without        having permission to do so, and copying a file from one network        node to another network node without having permission to do so.    -   ggg. “compromising a software application”—Successfully causing        the software application to execute an operation that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the network node on which the        software application is installed or by a vendor of the software        application, or successfully causing the execution of code in        the software application that was not predicted by the vendor of        the software application. Examples for compromising a software        application are changing a configuration file controlling the        operation of the software application without having permission        for doing so, and activating a privileged function of the        software application without having permission for doing so. In        addition, causing the software application to execute a macro        without checking rights of the macro code to do what it is        attempting to do is also considered compromising that software        application, even if not satisfying any of the conditions listed        above in this definition.    -   hhh. “administrator of a network node”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the network node.    -   iii. “administrator of a networked system”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the networked system. Note        that an administrator of a networked system may also be an        administrator of one or more of the network nodes of the        networked system.    -   jjj. “remote computing device” (with respect to a given        networked system)—A computing device that executes software        implementing part or all of the remote computing device        penetration testing software module. A remote computing device        may be (i) outside of the given networked system, or (ii) a        network node of the given networked system. A remote computing        device may (i) be a dedicated computing device that is dedicated        only to doing penetration testing, or (ii) also implement other        functionality not directly related to penetration testing. A        remote computing device is not limited to be a single physical        device with a single processing unit. It may be implemented by        multiple separate physical devices packaged in separate packages        that may be located at different locations. Each of the separate        physical devices may include one or multiple processing units. A        remote computing device may be (i) a physical computing device,        or (ii) a virtual machine running inside a physical computing        device on top of a hosting operating system.    -   kkk. “free event of/in a network node”—An event occurring in the        network node which is initiated in and by the network node and        is not directly caused or triggered by an entity outside that        network node. A free event of a network node may be initiated by        a user of the network node, by an operating system of the        network node or by an application executing on the network node.        A free event of a network node may be either an internal event        or a non-internal event of the network node. Examples of free        events of a network node are the insertion or removal of a USB        removable storage device into/from a socket of the network node,        the sending of a query to a web server in response to a user        manually entering the query, the sending of an ARP request        message by the network node while initializing the network node        after manually powering it up, and the sending of a WPAD message        by the network node in response to manually typing by the user        of a URL into a browser's address input box. Examples of events        of a network node that are not free events are the receiving of        a network message by the network node, and the sending of a        network message by the network node that is done in response to        receiving another network message from another network node.    -   lll. “explicitly selecting”—Directly and clearly selecting, by a        human user, of one option out of multiple options available to        human user, leaving no room for doubt and not relying on making        deductions by a computing device. Examples of explicit        selections are (i) selection of a specific type of an attacker        from a drop-down list of types, (ii) selection of specific one        or more attacker capabilities by marking one or more check boxes        in a group of multiple check boxes corresponding to multiple        attacker capabilities, and (iii) reception for viewing by a user        of a recommendation automatically computed by a computing device        for a value of an information item and actively approving by the        user of the recommendation for using the value, provided that        the approving user has an option of rejecting the recommendation        and selecting a different value for the information item.        Examples of selections that are not explicit selections are (i)        selection of specific one or more attacker capabilities by        selecting a specific scenario of a penetration testing system        from a pre-defined library of scenarios, where the specific        scenario includes an attacker having the one or more        capabilities, and (ii) selection of specific one or more        attacker capabilities by selecting a specific goal of an        attacker, accompanied by a deduction by a computing device        concluding that the specific one or more attacker capabilities        must being selected because they are essential for the attacker        to succeed in meeting the specific goal.    -   mmm. “automatically selecting”—Selecting, by a computing device,        of one option out of multiple options, without receiving from a        human user an explicit selection of the selected option. It        should be noted that the selecting of an option is an automatic        selecting even if the computing device is basing the selection        on one or more explicit selections by the user, as long as the        selected option itself is not explicitly selected by the user.        It should also be noted that receiving from a user of an        approval for a recommendation which is otherwise automatically        selected without giving the user an ability to override the        recommendation does not make the selection a non-automatic        selection. An example of an automatic selection is a selection        by a computing device of one or more attacker capabilities        by (a) receiving from a user an explicit selection of a specific        scenario of a penetration testing system from a pre-defined        library of scenarios, (b) determining by the computing device        that the specific scenario includes an attacker having the one        or more capabilities, and (c) deducing by the computing device        that the user wants to select the one or more attacker        capabilities. An example of a selection that is not an automatic        selection is a selection of a value for an information item        by (a) calculating by a computing device of a recommended value        for the information item, (b) displaying the recommendation to a        user, (c) receiving from the user an explicit approval to use        the recommended value of the information item, provided that the        approving user has an option of rejecting the recommendation and        selecting a different value for the information item.    -   nnn. “defensive application”—A software application whose task        is to defend the network node in which it is installed against        potential attackers. A defensive application may be a passive        defensive application, in which case it only detects and reports        penetration attempts into its hosting network node but does not        attempt to defend against the detected attacks. Alternatively, a        defensive application may be an active defensive application, in        which case it not only detects penetration attempts into its        hosting network node but also attempts to defend its hosting        node against the detected attacks by activating at least one        counter-measure.    -   ooo. “user interface”—A man-machine interface that does at least        one of (i) displaying information to a user, and (ii) receiving        input from the user. Towards this end, any user interface        includes at least one of (i) an input device (e.g. touch-screen,        mouse, keyboard, joystick, camera) for receiving input from the        user, and (ii) a display device (e.g. display screen such as a        touch-screen) for displaying information to the user. A user        interface typically also includes executable user-interface code        for at least one of (i) causing the display device to display        information to the user (e.g. to display text associated with        radio-buttons or with a check list, or text of a drop-down list)        and (ii) processing user-input received via the input device. In        different examples, the executable code may be compiled-code        (e.g. in assembly or machine-language), interpreted byte-code        (e.g. Java byte-code), or browser-executed code (e.g. JavaScript        code) that may be sent to a client device from a remote server        and then executed by the client device.    -   ppp. “user interface of a computing device”—A user interface        that is attached to the computing device and serves the        computing device for interacting with the user. An input device        of a user interface of a computing device may share a common        housing with the computing device (e.g. a touch-screen of a        tablet), or may be physically separate from the computing device        and be in communication with it, either through a physical port        (e.g. a USB port) or wirelessly (e.g. a wireless mouse). A        display device of a user interface of a computing device may        share a common housing with the computing device (e.g. a        touch-screen of a tablet), or may be physically separate from        the computing device and be in communication with it, either        through a physical port (e.g. an HDMI port) or wirelessly.        User-interface code of a user interface of a computing device is        stored in a memory accessible to the computing device and is        executed by one or more processors of the computing device. In        one example related to web-based user interfaces, at least some        of this code may be received from a remote server and then        locally executed by the computing device which functions as a        client. In another example related to locally-implemented user        interfaces, all of the user-interface code is pre-loaded onto        the computing device.    -   qqq. “or”—A logical operator combining two Boolean input        conditions into a Boolean compound condition, such that the        compound condition is satisfied if and only if at least one of        the two input conditions is satisfied. In other words, if        condition C=condition A or condition B, then condition C is not        satisfied when both condition A and condition B are not        satisfied, but is satisfied in each of the following cases: (i)        condition A is satisfied and condition B is not satisfied, (ii)        condition A is not satisfied and condition B is satisfied,        and (iii) both condition A and condition B are satisfied.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

All references cited herein are incorporated by reference in theirentirety. Citation of a reference does not constitute an admission thatthe reference is prior art.

It is further noted that any of the embodiments described above mayfurther include receiving, sending or storing instructions and/or datathat implement the operations described above in conjunction with thefigures upon a computer readable medium. Generally speaking, a computerreadable medium (e.g. non-transitory medium) may include storage mediaor memory media such as magnetic or flash or optical media, e.g. disk orCD-ROM, volatile or non-volatile media such as RAM, ROM, etc.

Having thus described the foregoing exemplary embodiments it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various equivalents,alterations, modifications, and improvements thereof are possiblewithout departing from the scope and spirit of the claims as hereafterrecited. In particular, different embodiments may include combinationsof features other than those described herein. Accordingly, the claimsare not limited to the foregoing discussion.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of penetration testing of a networkedsystem by a penetration testing system that is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device so that a penetration testing campaignis executed according to a manual and explicit selecting of one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system, the method comprising: receiving,by the penetration testing system and via the user interface of thecomputing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting the one or more networknodes of the networked system, wherein at least one of the manually andexplicitly selected nodes is other than the computing device; inaccordance with the manual and explicit selecting of the network nodes,executing the penetration testing campaign by the penetration testingsystem so as to test the networked system, the penetration testingcampaign being executed under the assumption that at the time ofbeginning the penetration testing campaign, the manually and explicitlyselected one or more network nodes of the networked system are both (i)already compromised and (ii) the only network nodes of the networkedsystem that are already compromised; and reporting, by the penetrationtesting system, at least one security vulnerability determined to existin the networked system by the executing of the penetration testingcampaign, wherein the reporting comprises at least one operationselected from the group consisting of: (i) causing a display device todisplay a report describing the at least one security vulnerability,(ii) storing the report containing information about the at least onesecurity vulnerability, and (iii) electronically transmitting the reportdescribing the at least one security vulnerability.
 2. The method ofclaim 1, wherein before receiving the one or more manually-enteredinputs that explicitly select the one or more network nodes of thenetworked system, the penetration testing system automatically computesand displays an explicit recommendation for selecting the one or morenetwork nodes that are the only network nodes that are alreadycompromised at the time of beginning the penetration testing campaign.3. The method of claim 2 wherein the received one or moremanually-entered inputs comprise an explicit user approval of theexplicit recommendation.
 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:subsequent to the receiving by the penetration testing system of the oneor more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system, receiving, by the penetrationtesting system and via the user interface of the computing device, oneor more additional manually-entered inputs, the one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a value for a secondinformation item of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the secondinformation item is not a set of one or more network nodes that areassumed to be the only network nodes that are already compromised at thetime of beginning the penetration testing campaign.
 5. The method ofclaim 4 wherein the executing of the penetration testing campaign isperformed using both (i) the manually and explicitly selected value forthe second information item, and (ii) the assumption that the manuallyand explicitly selected one or more network nodes of the networkedsystem are the only network nodes that are already compromised at thetime of beginning the penetration testing campaign.
 6. A system forpenetration testing of a networked system, the system comprising: a. anetwork-nodes-selection user interface including one or more userinterface components for manual and explicit selection of one or morenetwork nodes, where the network-nodes-selection user interface residesin a computing device and at least one of the manually and explicitlyselected one or more network nodes is other than the computing device;b. a penetration-testing-campaign module comprising: i. at least onepenetration-testing-campaign processor; and ii. apenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium for instructions execution by the one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processers, thepenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium having stored instructions to perform a penetration testingcampaign under the assumption that at the time of beginning thepenetration testing campaign, the manually and explicitly selected oneor more network nodes of the networked system are both (i)) alreadycompromised and (ii) the only network nodes of the networked system thatare already compromised; and c. a reporting module comprising: i. atleast one reporting processor; and ii. a reporting non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium for instructions execution by the oneor more reporting processors, the reporting non-transitory computerreadable storage medium having stored instructions to report at leastone security vulnerability determined to exist in the networked systemaccording to results of the penetration testing campaign that isperformed by the penetration-testing-campaign module, wherein thereporting module is configured to report the at least one securityvulnerability by performing at least one operation selected from thegroup consisting of: (i) causing a display device to display a reportdescribing the at least one security vulnerability, (ii) storing thereport containing information about the at least one securityvulnerability, and (iii) electronically transmitting the reportdescribing the at least one security vulnerability.
 7. The system ofclaim 6, further comprising a recommendation module comprising: i. atleast one recommendation processor; ii. a recommendation non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium for instructions execution by the oneor more recommendation processors, the recommendation non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium having stored instructions toautomatically compute an explicit recommendation for selecting the oneor more network nodes, wherein the network-nodes-selection userinterface displays the explicit recommendation.
 8. A method ofpenetration testing of a networked system by a penetration testingsystem that is controlled by a user interface of a computing device sothat a penetration testing campaign is executed according to a manuallyand explicitly provided node-selection condition, the method comprising:receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the user interfaceof the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one ormore manually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a Booleannode-selection condition, the manually and explicitly selectednode-selection condition defining a proper subset of network nodes ofthe networked system such that any network node of the networked systemis a member of the subset of network nodes if and only if it satisfiesthe condition; in accordance with the manual and explicit selecting ofthe node-selection condition, executing the penetration testing campaignby the penetration testing system so as to test the networked system,the penetration testing campaign being executed under the assumptionthat every node of the subset of network nodes is already compromised atthe time of beginning the penetration testing campaign; and reporting,by the penetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone operation selected from the group consisting of: (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, (ii) storing the report containing information about theat least one security vulnerability, and (iii) electronicallytransmitting the report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.
 9. The method of claim 8, wherein before receiving theone or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the Booleannode-selection condition, the penetration testing system automaticallycomputes and displays an explicit recommendation for selecting theBoolean node-selection condition.
 10. The method of claim 9 wherein thereceived one or more manually-entered inputs for selecting the Booleannode-selection condition comprise an explicit user approval of theexplicit recommendation.
 11. The method of claim 8, further comprising:subsequent to the receiving by the penetration testing system of the oneor more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select the Booleannode-selection condition, receiving, by the penetration testing systemand via the user interface of the computing device, one or moreadditional manually-entered inputs, the one or more additionalmanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a value for a secondinformation item of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the secondinformation item is not a node-selection condition defining a subset ofnetwork nodes that are assumed to be already compromised at the time ofbeginning the penetration testing campaign.
 12. The method of claim 11wherein the executing of the penetration testing campaign is performedusing both (i) the manually and explicitly selected value for the secondinformation item, and (ii) an assumption that every node of the subsetof network nodes is already compromised at the time of beginning thepenetration testing campaign.
 13. A method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system that is controlled by auser interface of a computing device so that a penetration testingcampaign is executed according to an automatic selecting of one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system, the method comprising:determining, by the penetration testing system, a type of an attacker ofthe penetration testing campaign; based on a result of the determining,automatically selecting, by the penetration testing system, the one ormore network nodes of the networked system, wherein at least one of theautomatically selected network nodes is other than the computing device;in accordance with the automatically selecting of the network nodes,executing the penetration testing campaign by the penetration testingsystem so as to test the networked system, the penetration testingcampaign being executed under the assumption that the automaticallyselected one or more network nodes of the networked system are alreadycompromised at the time of beginning the penetration testing campaign;and reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system by theexecuting of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the reportingcomprises at least one operation selected from the group consisting of:(i) causing a display device to display a report describing the at leastone security vulnerability, (ii) storing the report containinginformation about the at least one security vulnerability, and (iii)electronically transmitting the report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.
 14. The method of claim 13, wherein thedetermining of the type of the attacker comprises automaticallydetermining the type of the attacker by the penetration testing system.15. The method of claim 13, wherein the determining of the type of theattacker comprises receiving, via the user interface of the computingdevice, one or more manually-entered inputs that explicitly select thetype of the attacker.
 16. A method of penetration testing of a networkedsystem by a penetration testing system that is controlled by a userinterface of a computing device so that a penetration testing campaignis executed according to an automatic selecting of one or more networknodes of the networked system, the method comprising: automaticallydetermining, by the penetration testing system, whether one or morenetwork nodes of the networked system satisfy a pre-defined Booleancondition; based on a result of the determining, automaticallyselecting, by the penetration testing system, the one or more networknodes of the networked system, wherein at least one of the automaticallyselected network nodes is other than the computing device; in accordancewith the automatically selecting of the network nodes, executing thepenetration testing campaign by the penetration testing system so as totest the networked system, the penetration testing campaign beingexecuted under the assumption that the automatically selected one ormore network nodes of the networked system are already compromised atthe time of beginning the penetration testing campaign; and reporting,by the penetration testing system, at least one security vulnerabilitydetermined to exist in the networked system by the executing of thepenetration testing campaign, wherein the reporting comprises at leastone operation selected from the group consisting of: (i) causing adisplay device to display a report describing the at least one securityvulnerability, (ii) storing the report containing information about theat least one security vulnerability, and (iii) electronicallytransmitting the report describing the at least one securityvulnerability.
 17. The method of claim 16, wherein the pre-definedBoolean condition is satisfied for a given network node if and only ifthe given network node has a direct connection to a computing devicethat is outside the networked system.
 18. The method of claim 16,wherein the pre-defined Boolean condition is satisfied for a givennetwork node if and only if the given network node has an operatingsystem that is a member of a pre-defined set of operating systems. 19.The method of claim 16, wherein the pre-defined Boolean condition issatisfied for a given network node if and only if the given network nodehas a cellular communication channel.